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ABSTRACT

Secret Key Establishment Using Wireless Channels as Common
Randomness in Time-Variant MIMO Systems

Chan Chen
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Doctor of Philosophy
Encryption of confidential data with a secret key has become a widespread technique
for securing wireless transmissions. However, existing key distribution methods that either deliver the secret key with a key distribution center or exchange the secret key using public-key
cryptosystems are unable to establish perfect secret keys necessary for symmetric encryption techniques. This research considers secret key establishment, under the broad research
area of information theoretic security, using the reciprocal wireless channel as common randomness for the extraction of perfect secret keys in multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)
communication systems. The presentation discusses the fundamental characteristics of the
time-variant MIMO wireless channel and establishes a realistic channel simulation model useful for assessing key establishment algorithms. Computational examples show the accuracy
and applicability of the model. The discussion then turns to an investigation of the influence
of the spatial and temporal correlation of the channel coefficients on the bound of the key size
generated from the common channel, and it is found that a sampling approach exists that
can generate a key using the minimum sampling time. A practical key generation protocol
is then developed based on an enhancement of a published channel coefficient quantization
method that incorporates flexible quantization levels, public transmission of the correlation
eigenvector matrix and low-density parity-check (LDPC) coding to improve key agreement.
This investigation leads to the development of improved channel quantization techniques that
dynamically shift the quantization boundaries at one node based on the information provided
by the other node. Analysis based on a closed-form bound for the key error rate (KER) and
simulations based on the channel model and measurement data show that the enhanced algorithms are able to dramatically reduce key mismatch and asymptotically approach the KER
bound. Finally, other secret key generation algorithms based on channel-encryption rather
than quantization are discussed, leading to a new concept for secret key generation using the
common wireless channel.

Keywords: MIMO systems, cryptography, security.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Dr. Michael A. Jensen for his time, advice and patience, to
whom I owe a tremendous amount of gratitude for his guidance and encouragement in my
PhD education. I also want to thank all the other committee members: Brian D. Jeffs, David
G. Long, Michael D. Rice and Karl F. Warnick for their support. Last but not the least, I
owe my thanks to my parents for their care and love.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

xi

List of Figures

xvii

1 Introduction

1

1.1

New Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

1.2

Organization of the Dissertation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5

2 Fundamentals of Cryptography

9

2.1

Symmetric Encryption Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10

2.2

Conventional Key Distribution in Symmetric Encryption Systems . . . . . . .

12

2.3

Key Management Using Public-Key Cryptosystems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13

2.4

Unconditionally Secure Key Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15

2.4.1

Quantum Key Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15

2.4.2

Key Generation Using Common Wireless Channels . . . . . . . . . . .

17

Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

18

2.5

3 A Stochastic Model of the Time-Variant MIMO Channel based on Experimental Observations
21
3.1

Time-Varying Model Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23

3.1.1

Statistical Cluster Channel Modeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

24

3.1.2

Channel Measurements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

26

vii

3.1.3

Parameter Extraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

26

3.1.4

Parameter Stochastic Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

29

3.1.5

Cluster Birth and Death . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

30

3.1.6

Parameter Modeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

3.1.7

Model Implementation Discussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

34

3.1.8

MIMO Channel Synthesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

36

3.2

Model Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37

3.3

Extension to Three Dimensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

39

3.4

Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

42

4 Secret Key Establishment Using Temporally and Spatially Correlated Wireless Channel Coefficients
43
4.1

Physical Layer Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

44

4.1.1

An Example of Secure Beamforming Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . .

45

4.2

System Model for Secret Key Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

48

4.3

Bound on Key Length . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

50

4.3.1

Mathematical Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

50

4.3.2

Fixed Segment Length . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

53

4.3.3

Fixed Sampling Interval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

54

4.4

Channel Decorrelation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

57

4.5

Key Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

60

4.5.1

Coefficient Quantization Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

60

4.5.2

Flexible Quantization Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

61

4.5.3

Eigenvector Transmission

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

63

4.5.4

Key Generation Protocol with Coding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

65

Performance Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

66

4.6

viii

4.7

4.6.1

Fixed K, Variable SNR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

67

4.6.2

Fixed SNR, Variable K . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

68

Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

70

5 Improved Channel Quantization Techniques for Secret Key Establishment 73
5.1

5.2

5.3

5.4

Key Establishment Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

73

5.1.1

System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

73

5.1.2

Channel Quantization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

74

Algorithm Generalization and Performance Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

78

5.2.1

Generalized CQA Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

79

5.2.2

Generalized MAQ Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

79

5.2.3

Boundary Margin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

80

5.2.4

Error Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

82

5.2.5

Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

83

Correlated Channel Coefficients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

86

5.3.1

SVA model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

87

5.3.2

Time-Varying Channel Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

88

Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

89

6 Channel-Encryption Based Key Establishment Algorithms
6.1

93

Secret Key Generation with Channel Multiplication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

94

6.1.1

System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

94

6.1.2

Key Establishment Using Channel Multiplication . . . . . . . . . . . .

95

6.1.3

Statistical Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

96

6.1.4

Impact of Correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

98

6.1.5

Reducing Key Mismatch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

99

ix

6.2

6.3

6.4

6.1.6

Simulation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

6.1.7

Discussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

Secret Key Generation with Channel Addition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
6.2.1

Key Establishment Algorithm Using Channel Addition . . . . . . . . . 107

6.2.2

Simulation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

Secret Key Generation with One-Time Pad Public Discussion

. . . . . . . . . 112

6.3.1

Algorithm Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

6.3.2

Public Discussion Achieving Perfect Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

6.3.3

Upper Bound of the Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

6.3.4

Comparison to CQA and MAQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

6.3.5

Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

7 Conclusion

121

7.1

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

7.2

Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

7.3

Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

Bibliography

126

A Model Implementation Parameters

133

B Proofs for Channel-Based Encryption Algorithms

135

x

List of Tables

4.1

SNR thresholds (in dB) to achieve KER = 10−3 (without coding). . . . . . . .

63

4.2

SNR thresholds (in dB) to achieve KER = 10−3 (with LDPC coding). . . . . .

67

6.1

A simple example of the algorithm, Q = 22 , N = 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

A.1 Coefficients for estimating the PSD for each cluster parameter. . . . . . . . . . 134
A.2 PMF of the cluster power gain mean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
A.3 PMF of σG conditioned on µG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

xi

xii

List of Figures

2.1

Simplified model of symmetric encryption. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10

2.2

Automatic key distribution with a trusted third party.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

13

2.3

Diffie-Hellman key exchange. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15

2.4

Model of quantum key distribution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

16

3.1

Illustration of the PAS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27

3.2

One example of time series of AOA, AOD and power gain derived from the
measurement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

28

Zero-mean, unit-variance pdfs for the AOA, AOD, and power gain for the multipath clusters obtained from the data as well as the stochastic time-varying
model using 50 time series each of 2000 samples. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

Power spectra for the AOA, AOD, and power gain for the multipath clusters
obtained from the data as well as the stochastic time-varying model using 50
time series each of 2000 samples. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

32

Probability mass functions of the number of clusters born each time sample
and the survival time Kq for a cluster. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

33

Innovation process pdfs for the AOA, AOD, and power gain used as inputs for
the time-varying stochastic multipath cluster model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

33

Block diagram describing the AR model used to generate the AOD, AOA, or
power gain of an individual cluster in the time-varying stochastic multipath
model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

34

One example of time series of AOA, AOD and power gain derived from the
model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

34

PDFs of the zero-mean unit-variance AOA model outputs for different model
order p, using the autocorrelation method. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35

3.3

3.4

3.5
3.6
3.7

3.8
3.9

xiii

3.10 PDFs of the zero-mean unit-variance AOA model outputs for different model
order p, using the covariance method. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

36

3.11 Normalized average TCD metric as a function of receiver displacement computed from the original measured data and the time-variant model. . . . . . .

40

3.12 Normalized average RCD metric as a function of receiver displacement computed from the original measured data and the time-variant model. . . . . . .

40

4.1

CDF of the power ratio γ using eigen-beamforming (EBF) and generalized
eigen-beamforming (GEBF) techniques. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

48

Model illustrating the channel sampling process with K successive samples in
a sampling segment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49

Model illustrating the communication between two legitimate nodes Alice and
Bob in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

50

The information potentially disclosed to Eve as a function of the distance d0
between Eve and Alice. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

52

(a) Channel sampling within a window size of the coherence distance with an
increasing number of samples and equal intervals. (b) Channel sampling with
a fixed interval and an increasing number of samples. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

53

Bound as a function of the number of samples K within a segment assuming
SNR = 20 dB and for different sample averaging windows W . All K samples
reside within the coherence distance, and the simulations use the simple SISO
channel model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

55

Top: Bound versus the number of samples when the samples are obtained
with fixed sample intervals. Bottom: The distance required to obtain 128
bits with different number of samples within a segment. The simulations use
SNR = 20 dB with the simple SISO channel model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

56

KER for i.i.d. complex Gaussian random variables using CQA with different
quantization levels and Lkey = 128 bits as well as the performance of the phase
quantization algorithm with Q = 21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

62

KER-versus-SNR with or without the transmission of the eigenvector matrix. .

64

4.10 Key length per channel as a function of SNR using different key generation
algorithms for a 2 × 2 system, K = 1, KER = 10−3 , Lkey = 128. . . . . . . . .

68

4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5

4.6

4.7

4.8

4.9

4.11 Key length per channel as a function of SNR using the key generation protocol
with LDPC coding for different antenna arrays, K = 1, KER = 10−3 , Lkey = 128. 69

xiv

4.12 Key establishment performance compared to the bound using d = Lc /9, KER =
10−3 and SNR = 20 dB for a 2 × 2 system. Top: Bits per temporal sample
as a function of the number of samples when the samples are obtained with
fixed sample intervals. Bottom: The distance required to achieve 128 bits with
different numbers of samples within a segment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

70

4.13 The minimum distance required to achieve 128 bits for different numbers of
antennas with d = Lc /9, SNR = 20 dB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

71

5.1

Illustration of the quantization regions using the traditional quantization
method with Q = 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

75

Illustration of the quantization regions of the CQA scheme with Q = 4 for
QM = 0, 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

76

Illustration of the quantization regions of the MAQ scheme with Q = 4 for
R = 0, 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

77

SER performance for CQA(N) and MAQ(N) with Q = 21 and different values
of N compared to that for traditional quantization and the bound. . . . . . . .

78

5.5

Illustration of the boundary margin concept for CQA(5). . . . . . . . . . . . .

81

5.6

SER performance bound of the algorithms for four different quantization levels
Q. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

83

KER for CQA(N) and MAQ(N) with Q = 21 and different values of N compared to that of the bound for a key of length L = 128 bits. . . . . . . . . . .

84

SNR required to achieve SER = 10−6 for CQA(NC ) as a function of NC with
Q = 21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

85

Number of bits per independent channel realization as a function of SNR for
the algorithms compared to that given by the upper performance bound. . . .

85

5.10 Number of bits per Nr × Nt MIMO channel as a function of SNR for different
array sizes and SER = 10−6 as well as that for the upper bound for a 3 × 3
system, simulated with SVA model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

88

5.11 Number of bits per Nr × Nt MIMO channel as a function of SNR for different
array sizes and SER = 10−6 as well as that for the upper bound for a 3 × 3
system, simulated with the time-variant model and W = 20. . . . . . . . . . .

90

5.12 Number of bits per Nr × Nt MIMO channel as a function of SNR for different
array sizes and SER = 10−6 as well as that for the upper bound for a 3 × 3
system, simulated with the time-variant model and W = 100. . . . . . . . . . .

91

5.2
5.3
5.4

5.7
5.8
5.9

xv

5.13 Complementary CDF of the eigenvalues from the estimated channel covariance
with W = 20 for a 3 × 3 system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

91

5.14 Complementary CDF of the eigenvalues from the estimated channel covariance
with W = 100 for a 3 × 3 system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

92

5.15 Complementary CDF of the eigenvalues from the estimated SVA channel covariance for a 3 × 3 system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

92

6.1

PMF of number of realizations of A(k) required to pass the statistical tests for
the 3 × 3 channel with quantization level Q = 22 . The simulations use 2000
random channel sequences each with length K = 110 and assume Gray codes,
least-square and channel averaging methods are used for BER reduction. . . . 103

6.2

BER vs. SNR when using natural binary and Gray codes as well as leastsquare estimation. The simulations use 2000 3 × 3 channel sequences with
length K = 110 and a quantization level Q = 24 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

6.3

BER vs. SNR when using the channel averaging method with two different
averaging windows W compared to that using Gray coding. The simulations
use 2000 3 × 3 channel sequences with length K = 110 and a quantization level
Q = 24 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

6.4

BER vs. SNR when combining Gray coding, least-square estimation, and channel averaging (W = 10) for different quantization levels Q. The simulations
use 2000 3 × 3 channel sequences with length K = 110. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

6.5

Secret key in bits per channel realization with BER = 10−3 using Gray codes,
least-square, and channel averaging for NE = 1 and different numbers of antennas.107

6.6

Secret key in bits per channel realization with BER = 10−3 using Gray codes,
least-square, channel averaging, and information reconciliation with LDPC
codes for NE = 1 and different numbers of antennas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

6.7

Secret key in bits per channel realization for the Maurer’s bound and the algorithm with BER = 10−3 using Gray codes, least-square, and error averaging
with or without LDPC codes for NE = 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

6.8

Information potentially disclosed to Eve as a function of γ for different antenna
arrays. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

6.9

BER performance of the algorithm with Q = 22 , γ = 0.25, 0.5, 1, 2 for a 3 × 3
system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

6.10 Number of bits generated per channel with BER = 10−4 before applying privacy
amplification to hash out the information potentially disclosed to Eve, with
γ = 0.25, 0.5, 1, 2 for a 3 × 3 system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
xvi

6.11 Number of bits generated per channel with BER = 10−4 after applying privacy
amplification to hash out the information potentially disclosed to Eve, with
γ = 0.25, 0.5, 1, 2 for a 3 × 3 system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
6.12 A graphic illustration of the algorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
6.13 SER performance of the algorithm with Q = 21 and N = 3, 5, 7 respectively. . 118
6.14 KER performance with quantization level Q = 21 , key length L = 128 bits and
N = 3, 5, 7 respectively. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

xvii

xviii

Chapter 1
Introduction
The public nature of wireless transmissions for data communication can potentially
allow an eavesdropper easy access to the information exchanged. As a result, the development of robust techniques for ensuring the security of sensitive information has become an
important emphasis within the wireless communication research community. For example,
recent work has demonstrated the security implications of secure beamforming [1] or timereversal signaling [2], as well as other physical layer techniques for lowering the probability of
intercept of the information [3, 4]. Arguably the most common and widely used technique for
increasing security is the use of a cipher to encrypt the data transmitted through the public
channel, either using symmetric encryption techniques or asymmetric public-key encryption
methods. While symmetric encryption is most common, it requires the generation and distribution of a unique secret key between the two legitimate nodes [5], which can become a
significant challenge, especially for networks with a large number of communicating peers. An
alternate cryptosystem based on public keys avoids this key distribution problem by applying
a pair of asymmetric keys, but it suffers from high computational overhead that can make
encryption/decryption speeds too slow for general data encryption/decryption use [5].
As a result of these challenges, public-key encryption techniques are typically used
in digital signatures and in the distribution of secret keys for symmetric encryption. Although these public-key encryption techniques provide an approach for delivering keys used
in symmetric encryption, they are merely computationally secure, which means the secrecy
of the secret keys are compromised if computational power is improved dramatically and/or
an efficient method is discovered that solves the underlying difficult mathematical problem.
Therefore, the community continues to search for practical techniques that achieve unconditional security.
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Much work has focused attention on the establishment of secret keys from common
randomness [6], a technique which fits within the broader information theoretic security research. The advantage of such an approach for key generation is that it alleviates the problems
of key distribution in many traditional cryptographic methods and distills the perfect secret
key from the secrecy shared between the two legitimate nodes wishing to communicate. While
such perfect secret key establishment has been implemented in quantum systems [7, 8], its
application is limited due to practical problems associated with imperfections in the quantum
systems as well as the high expense and complexity required to establish a dedicated quantum
channel. In contrast, the convenient availability of the common channel in a wireless communication system makes it an excellent source of common randomness, motivating efforts to
exploit this channel for secret key generation. Prior work on this topic has largely focused on
developing the foundation of this technique, with major contributions including a derivation
of the key-capacity [9], or equivalently the secret key rate [6], which is the maximum possible key size given a common randomness available to the legitimate nodes and associated
with arbitrarily small (1) probability of key disagreement and (2) information revealed to an
eavesdropper.
Prior work has also suggested algorithm features required for successful key generation [10]. While all algorithms are based on the same general principles of common randomness, they differ considerably in their underlying foundations. In an ultrawideband system
such as that considered in [11, 12], the error of the actual channel measurement and the
channel impulse response predicted with an LMS predictor is quantized to generate secret
bits assuming that the prediction errors are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d).
For narrowband systems, techniques have been proposed that generate keys by either discretizing extracted coefficients of the multipath components [13] or quantizing the channel
phases [14] for a multitone communication system such that multiple independent phases are
used to generate longer keys. However, the former technique neglects the fact that multipath
components tend to vary slowly with time [15], making construction of long keys through
multiple independent channel realizations difficult. The latter approach ignores the common
randomness available in the amplitude of the channel coefficient, resulting in increased key
mismatch and low key generation efficiency. Alternative applicable approaches include either
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directly quantizing the complex channel coefficients [16] or generating keys from a purposely
constructed random variable [17] whose realizations are communicated between the legitimate
nodes, with secrecy achieved provided that the eavesdropper does not know its own channel
to the legitimate nodes.
While all of these algorithms are capable of extracting at least a portion of the common randomness available in the observed channel information, the quantization techniques
tend to suffer from high probability of disagreement for the bits generated at the two nodes.
This has led to the incorporation of error correction coding strategies within the algorithms,
such as coset assignment [11], low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes [16, 17], and Hamming
codes [12]. Unfortunately, these techniques reduce the key establishment efficiency, since a
portion of the generated bits must be hashed out during privacy amplification [10] as a result
of the public transmission of information about the key (such as the coset or code syndrome).
Other techniques to improve key agreement involve developing new quantization algorithms
that transmit information to improve key agreement without revealing information about the
key to the eavesdropper [18, 19]. This latter approach has been proven effective for improving
the key error rate (KER) while maintaining key establishment efficiency, especially when the
channel estimation signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is high.
A key observation highlighted in the prior work is that when using the reciprocal channel as common information for key establishment, differences in channel estimates at the two
nodes due to noise or other practical considerations limit the number of key bits that can be
generated from a single sample of the channel. Therefore, establishment of long keys requires
the concatenation of multiple channel samples. Most prior work has assumed that these samples are temporally white and obtained from a single-input single-output (SISO) system, and
therefore considers neither the performance implications of using correlated channel samples
(in space and/or time) nor the practical issues associated with whitening of these samples.
However, intuition suggests that using channel samples more closely spaced in time and from
multiple antennas could lead to improved key generation rates, even if the samples are partially
correlated.
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1.1

New Contributions
Motivated by limitations in prior work and these observations, this dissertation focuses

on secret key establishment in a time-varying multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) system.
Particular emphasis is placed on the impact of spatial and temporal correlation of the channel
matrices and on the development of efficient key generation algorithms that extract secrecy
from time-variant MIMO channel. The main contributions of this dissertation are:
1. A stochastic time-variant MIMO channel model is developed that enables simulation of
practical key generation algorithms and therefore allows the evaluation of their efficiency
and performance.
2. The impact of channel correlation on the theoretical bound of the key size is established
through analytical derivations and computational studies. This exploration leads to
the discovery of an efficient channel sampling approach that generates a key with a
specified length by moving the communicating node over the shortest possible distance
(or time interval). A practical protocol for key establishment based on the algorithm
proposed in [18] is evaluated in detail and is extended to incorporate flexible quantization
levels, public transmission of the eigenvector matrix and channel coding for improved
key generation efficiency.
3. Two algorithms presented in the literature [18, 19] for quantizing complex channel coefficients for key establishment are generalized to allow the resulting KER between the
two nodes involved in the key establishment to approach the theoretical lower bound.
A metric, referred to as boundary margin, is defined to characterize the key mismatch
performance of the techniques.
4. Three additional key generation algorithms based on encryption with the channel rather
than quantization of the channel are proposed. Although some questions remain regarding certain subtle details associated with these algorithms, they are included as they
provide different perspectives regarding the key generation process.
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1.2

Organization of the Dissertation
Following a brief introduction designed to motivate the main topic of the dissertation,

we provide an overview of the prior work in the area of key establishment using the wireless
channel as common randomness in Chapter 2. This chapter also provides the fundamental
background on cryptography, concentrating on key distribution used in symmetric encryption
techniques. Specifically, it focuses on key distribution with a centralized key distribution center
and key exchange using public-key encryption techniques. Finally, the treatment exploits key
generation using common randomness in a quantum system or a wireless communication
system, which eliminates the necessity of key distribution between the two legitimate nodes.
Chapter 3 proposes a stochastic multipath model useful for generating MIMO channel
matrices in time-variant environments. The multipath model is developed by first extracting
the relevant multipath cluster characteristics from measured indoor channel data and subsequently capturing these characteristics in an auto-regressive stochastic model. This model is
then used to generate channel matrices whose space-time characteristics closely match those of
realistic scenarios, particularly when birth and death of multipath clusters are included in the
stochastic representation. Computational examples reveal the applicability and accuracy of
the approach. While the current implementation is based on data taken assuming propagation
is confined to the horizontal plane, the paper also discusses extension of the model to describe
three-dimensional propagation, enabling is application to a wide range of physical scenarios
and antenna characteristics. This model is used throughout the dissertation to evaluate the
performance of the techniques proposed for key establishment.
Chapter 4 considers establishing secret keys using the common wireless channel, with
particular consideration of the spatial and temporal correlation of the channel coefficients.
Specifically, the influence of channel correlation on the bound of the key size generated from
the common channel using a simple SISO channel model is considered, and the existence of
a sampling approach able to generate a key using the minimum possible sampling window
is verified. Decorrelation of the channel coefficients in a MIMO channel is explored, and a
statistical independence test is used to demonstrate that this process cannot be separated into
spatial and temporal decorrelation processes. The insights gained from these studies assist in
the development of a practical key generation protocol based on a published channel coefficient
5

quantization method with the addition of flexible quantization levels, transmission of the correlation eigenvector matrix, and LDPC coding to improve key agreement in an authenticated
public channel. Finally, simulations with real channel measurements are presented to solidify
the fundamental conclusions.
Chapter 5 explores the issue of improving the agreement in bits generated by two nodes
as they form secret encryption keys by quantizing their common wireless channel. Specifically,
two recently-proposed algorithms are discussed with the demonstration that they both operate
on the principle that the quantization boundaries for one node are dynamically shifted based
on information supplied by the other node. This understanding leads to the generalization
of the algorithms such that they enable increased flexibility in this boundary shifting and to
the derivation of a closed-form expression for the bound on the KER of keys with a specified
length. Simulations reveal the dramatic improvement in key agreement performance enabled
by the enhanced algorithms, demonstrate that the KER performance of the algorithm can
asymptotically approach that predicted by the closed-form bound, and show that the key
generation efficiency of the algorithms is high compared to that indicated by information
theoretic bounds. This chapter also demonstrates application of the algorithms to multiple
correlated channel samples, and simulations show that the use of the algorithms with multipleantenna channels can dramatically increase the number of key bits generated by a single
channel observation.
Chapter 6 provides a discussion of other key generation algorithms that are applicable to time-variant MIMO systems and that are based on channel encryption. An algorithm
that encrypts the secret key using channel multiplication and then transmits that encrypted
information to a receiving node is proposed and analyzed. Because this public discussion
potentially discloses information about the secret key to the eavesdropper, we use a statistical test to minimize the information revealed. Unfortunately, even with this enhancement,
independence cannot be guaranteed, which motivates the introduction of a key generation algorithm that encrypts the transmitted key through addition with the channel matrix. In this
approach, although some information still has to be transmitted across the public channel, the
information potentially disclosed to the eavesdropper can be estimated and therefore hashed
out from the key, resulting in a perfect secret key. Finally, an algorithm that uses a one-time
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pad public discussion is presented, which incorporates both channel-based encryption and
channel quantization. In this case, because the public discussion achieves perfect secrecy, no
information is required to be hashed out from the discussion. We finally demonstrate that
this algorithm has a performance similar to that of the algorithms introduced in Chapter 5,
with the notable difference that the proposed algorithms requires additional bits transmitted
through the channel.
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Chapter 2
Fundamentals of Cryptography
Security services in a network include authentication, access control, data confidentiality, integrity, and nonrepudiation, as listed in ITU-T Recommendation X.800, Security
Architecture for Open Systems Interconnection. Various mechanisms are proposed to fulfill
these services, such as digital signature, authentication exchange, etc. As one of the pervasive
mechanisms, encipherment is widely implemented because of its ability to accomplish multiple
services such as authentication, data confidentiality, and integrity.
Until the development of public-key (or asymmetric) encryption, symmetric encryption
was the only available encryption technique, and it has been used for centuries. The symmetric
encryption technique applies substitution and transposition for message scrambling, and the
same keys are used at the two communication nodes. Since the security of communication
depends on the secrecy of the keys, generating and delivering the keys in a covert method
becomes a challenge, especially for a large network with numerous communicating nodes.
The proposal of public-key encryption obviates the key distribution problem, because a pair
of asymmetric keys is used at the two communication nodes with one of the keys publicly
announced. Despite this advantage over symmetric encryption, the application of public-key
encryption is limited in digital signature and key exchange because its computational overhead
makes it too slow for encryption/decryption with large amounts of data.
In this chapter, we introduce the fundamentals of symmetric encryption systems and
discuss the conventional key distribution process based on a key distribution center. Key
exchange with public-key encryption techniques is also presented. Finally, we consider key
generation from common randomness to eliminate problems associated with conventional key
distribution, with quantum key distribution as well as key generation from the common wireless channel being used as specific examples.
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Figure 2.1: Simplified model of symmetric encryption.

2.1

Symmetric Encryption Systems
Figure 2.1 depicts a general model for a symmetric encryption system, with the essential

elements listed below:
1. plaintext, which is the message to be sent between the two legitimate nodes (designated
as Alice and Bob) and is the input of the encryption process.
2. a secret key, which is shared by Alice and Bob only, and should be kept secret.
3. an encryption/decryption algorithm, which defines how to perform substitution and permutation of the data.
4. ciphertext, which is the output of the encryption algorithm, representing the encrypted
version of the plaintext.
Alice encrypts the message using the encryption algorithm and the secret key, and sends the
ciphertext to Bob. Because Bob shares the same key with Alice, he is able to decrypt the
ciphertext and obtain the message by applying the decryption algorithm. Figure 2.1 also
indicates the presence of a malicious eavesdropper, designated as Eve.
The ideal cryptographic system is unconditionally secure, which means it is perfectly
secret regardless of the number of cipertexts and plaintexts communicated or the computational power of Eve. Shannon proposed in [20] that a necessary and sufficient condition for
10

perfect secrecy is
p(C|M) = p(C),

(2.1)

where M is the message, C is the ciphertext of M encrypted with the key K, and p(·) is
the probability mass function. In other words, if C and M are statistically independent, or
I(C; M) = 0 where I(·) is the mutual information function, perfect secrecy is achieved. The
one-time pad proposed by Vernam in [21] and later improved by Mauborgne is the only known
method for achieving perfect secrecy. However, this method has two impractical conditions:
1. H(K) ≥ H(M), where H(·) is the entropy function,
2. K is truly random and is used only once.
Because of these conditions, the one-time pad is not used in practical applications.
As a result of the impracticality of achieving perfect secrecy, the community resorts
to computational security in realistic systems. An encryption scheme is considered to be
computationally secure if it satisfies one or both of the following requirements [5]:
1. The expense to break the code exceeds the value of the encrypted message.
2. The time required to break the code exceeds the useful lifetime of the message.
The symmetric cryptographic system which is capable of achieving computational security relies on two facts:
1. Strong encryption algorithms are applied such that even if Eve obtains a number of
ciphertexts and the corresponding plaintexts, it is impossible for her to decrypt the
other ciphertexts or derive the key.
2. A sufficiently long secret key shared by Alice and Bob is used in encryption/decryption.
While numerous algorithms satisfy the first condition, i.e., Triple DES, AES, etc., research
on these algorithms is outside the scope of our work, and we focus on the second issue which
involves creation, distribution and protection of the secret key.
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2.2

Conventional Key Distribution in Symmetric Encryption Systems
As pointed out in [22], successful key management is critical in assuring security in a

cryptographic system, and it includes key generation, storage, distribution, deletion, archiving
and proper usage. Key distribution is the central issue of key management and refers to
delivering a key between two parties for secure data transmission without exposing the key
to other unauthorized parties. Because manual key delivery is time-consuming, expensive,
and very inefficient, especially for distributed networks with numerous nodes, automatic key
delivery over the communication channel is desirable, which calls for a pre-shared master key
that is used to encrypt the session key which is in turn used for data transmission in the
current session. The security of a key depends on the amount of data it is used to encrypt,
which means that although we have to update the session key frequently, we can use the master
key for a relatively long time because the master key is only used to encrypt the session keys
representing a small amount of information.
Figure 2.2 depicts a key distribution scenario with a trusted third party, referred to as
the key distribution center (KDC), with the sequence of steps illustrated in the figure:
1. Alice initiates a request to the KDC, asking for a session key to protect data transmission
to Bob.
2. The KDC generates a random session key and transmits the encrypted versions of the
session key to both Alice and Bob, where Alice or Bob receives the session key encrypted
with a master key. Alice and Bob each have different master keys known only by
themselves and the KDC.
3. Because Alice and Bob know their respective master keys, they can decrypt the session
key. A secure data transmission channel is established between Alice and Bob using the
session key.
In a network with N nodes, the key distribution with a KDC requires N master keys
pre-shared by the KDC and the nodes. However, in a fully decentralized network without a
KDC, N(N − 1)/2 master keys are required because in this scenario each node is acting as a
KDC capable of generating and delivering session keys to all nodes with potential communication. Although the usage of a KDC dramatically reduces the number of master keys required,
12
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Figure 2.2: Automatic key distribution with a trusted third party.

the centralized distribution imposes high vulnerability of key exposure because all secrecy is
lost if the KDC is subverted. Furthermore, when using a centralized KDC, even if the session
keys are securely distributed in an automatic approach, the automatic delivery and updating
of the master keys remains an unsolved problem.
2.3

Key Management Using Public-Key Cryptosystems
The development of public-key cryptosystems represents a milestone in the history of

cryptography, not only because public-key algorithms are based on mathematical functions
instead of substitution and transposition used in symmetric cryptosystems, but also because
asymmetric keys - one public, one private - are used, which eliminates the secret key distribution problems in symmetric cryptosystems. This development has also profoundly impacted
authentication, such as the application of digital signature. However, the tremendous computational overhead of public-key algorithms excludes the application of public-key encryption
in encryption/decryption with large amounts of data, which restricts its application in key
management and signatures [23].
Arguably, one of the most common mechanisms for delivering secret keys using publickey cryptosystems is the Diffie-Hellman key exchange [24] shown graphically in Fig. 2.3. Before
any key exchange, a large prime number p as well as a primitive root of p denoted as α are
publicly selected by the two users Alice and Bob wishing to exchange secret key information. A
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primitive root of a prime number is defined as an integer smaller than p, whose powers generate
all the integers from 1 to p−1 with modulo p. That is, mod(α, p), mod(α2 , p), . . . , mod(αp−1, p)
are p−1 distinct integers, consisting of a permutation of the integer sequence {1, 2, 3, . . . , p−1},
where mod(·, p) represents modulo of p. For any integer β and a primitive root α of the prime
number p, we can find a unique exponent i such that
mod(β, p) = mod(αi , p),

(2.2)

with 0 ≤ i ≤ p − 1. The symbol i is referred to as the discrete logarithm of β with base α and
modulo p.
Next, Alice generates a private random number Xa with Xa < p and computes
Ya = mod(αXa , p). Similarly, Bob randomly generates Xb with Xb < p and calculates
Yb = mod(αXb , p). The two users exchange Ya and Yb through the public channel, and finally compute the secret key K as Ka = mod(YbXa , p) and Kb = mod(YaXb , p) respectively. It
can be shown that K = Ka = Kb using the steps [5]
Ka = mod(YbXa , p)
= mod((mod(αXb , p))Xa , p)
= mod((αXb )Xa , p)
= mod(αXb Xa , p)
= mod((mod(αXa , p))Xb , p)
= mod(YaXb , p)
= Kb .

(2.3)

The security of this technique relies on the fact that it is relatively easy to compute
exponentials modulo a prime, but it is computationally difficult to calculate discrete logarithms [5, 25]. That is, even if α, p, and Ya or Yb are known, it is computationally difficult to
derive Xa or Xb and eventually the secret key K. Therefore, the Diffie-Hellman key exchange
technique is not unconditional secure, meaning it is vulnerable to improvement in computational power or the discovery of efficient algorithms to solve discrete logarithm problems.
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Figure 2.3: Diffie-Hellman key exchange.

2.4

Unconditionally Secure Key Distribution
Unconditionally secure key distribution can be accomplished by distilling secrecy from

common randomness [6, 9]. One overwhelming benefit of unconditional (or information theoretic) security is that no computational restrictions are placed on the eavesdropper and that
statistically no secrecy is disclosed to the eavesdropper.
2.4.1

Quantum Key Distribution
Quantum cryptography, also known as quantum key distribution (QKD), is an exam-

ple of a technique implemented in practice to achieve unconditional security in secret key
distribution. One fundamental aspect of quantum systems is that measuring a quantum state
disturbs the system, as stated in the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. Specifically, in a quantum system only one property of a pair of conjugate properties can be known with certainty,
which enables the detection of eavesdropping on the quantum channel.
There are two types of protocols available in quantum cryptography, the BB84 protocol [7] and Ekert’s protocol [8], as well as their respective variants. All of the protocols assume
that there are two channels available - the quantum channel and the classical channel - between Alice and Bob as depicted in Fig. 2.4. The security of the protocols is based on the fact
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Figure 2.4: Model of quantum key distribution.

that Eve must in some way measure the quantum channel to eavesdrop on the key exchange,
introducing detectable anomalies that indicate to Alice and Bob a breach in security.
In order to fully appreciate the unconditionally secure key distribution accomplished
by quantum cryptography, we consider the BB84 protocol in more detail. In this algorithm,
the secret information is encoded in the photon polarization quantum states. Two conjugate
bases each with two orthogonal states are used in BB84: the rectilinear basis of vertical (0◦ )
and horizontal (90◦) polarizations, and the diagonal basis of 45◦ and 135◦ polarizations. At the
beginning of quantum communication, Alice generates a random bit (0 or 1), selects randomly
one of the bases with equal probability, and encodes the polarization of the photon according
to the chosen basis and the value of the random bit. For example, if the rectilinear basis is
selected, then a photon with polarization of 90◦ is transmitted through the quantum channel
if the random bit equals to 0; otherwise, a photon with polarization of 0◦ is transmitted.
Because Bob doesn’t know which basis Alice has used to encrypt the random bit, he chooses
randomly one of the bases with equal probability to measure the polarization of the photon.
This is repeated for a sequence of bits, and afterwards Alice and Bob communicate through
the public channel regarding the bases they have used. They discard all the bits for which
the bases disagree, which on average results in half of the bits remaining.
We note that it is impossible to distinguish the 4 polarization states representing by
the two bases because they are not all orthogonal. For example, if we use the rectilinear basis
to measure a photon created using the same basis, we can correctly measure the horizontal or
vertical polarization. However, if we select the diagonal basis to measure the same photon, then
assuming that the measurement selects the output with highest intensity, the measurement
will return 45◦ or 135◦ randomly. Moreover, after measurement all the information about the
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initial state is lost and the resulting photon is polarized in one of the states of the measured
basis.
Suppose the quantum channel is perfect and that no error is introduced during the
transmission. Under ideal conditions, the presence of eavesdropping can be detected accurately
by comparing a subset of Alice and Bob’s secret bits publicly. As an illustration, assume that
Eve intercepts all the photons sent from Alice to Bob in the quantum channel by measuring
with the rectilinear or diagonal basis, and resends the measured states to Bob. The probability
that Eve chooses the incorrect basis is 0.5 because Alice selects the bases randomly with equal
probability, and if an incorrect basis is used by Eve, Bob will get a random result by measuring
the intercepted photon even if he uses the same basis as Alice. That is, the probability that
an intercepted photon generates an error is 0.5 × 0.5 = 0.25. If Alice and Bob compare a
subset of n bits, then the probability of subset disagreement is Ps = 1 − 0.75n . Because any

bit error indicates eavesdropping under ideal conditions, the probability of detecting Eve is
equal to Ps if eavesdropping has occurred, with Ps ≃ 1 when n = 72.
In a practical situation, bit disagreement between Alice and Bob can be introduced by
imperfect channels or eavesdropping. Because we can not distinguish between bit errors caused
by transmission and those caused by eavesdropping, all erroneous bits are considered to be
the result of eavesdropping, and therefore privacy amplification [10] is applied to distill the ultimate secret key. Although quantum key distribution proposes an unconditionally secure key
distribution approach, practical implementation limitations such as imperfect measurement
abilities and the requirement of a dedicated quantum channel make quantum cryptography
too expensive and impractical for widespread use.
2.4.2

Key Generation Using Common Wireless Channels
Arguably, a more common practical approach for establishing perfect secret keys is to

distill secrecy from the common wireless channel in time-division duplex (TDD) systems. In
this approach, we rely on the fact that the radio channel is reciprocal on both link directions.
Physically, this is realized because electromagnetic waves traveling in both directions experience the same physical perturbations such as reflection, refraction, diffraction, etc., when
the link in both directions operates in the same frequency band. The reciprocity of the radio
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channel enables Alice and Bob to establish shared common randomness by estimating the
common channel separately by two-way channel training without using channel estimation
feedback. The fluctuation of the radio waves is an uncontrollable random process depending
on the specific environment, and any movement of the nodes or motion of the scatterers leads
to temporal variations of the radio channel and eventually makes the samples of the channel
transfer function uncorrelated. Because the multipath radio channel also varies in space so
that unique channels exist at nodes at different positions, it is possible (in fact probable) that
the eavesdropper’s channel to either legitimate node is independent of the common channel
as long as Eve is sufficiently far away from Alice and Bob in a rich scattering environment.
Channel reciprocity, temporal variation, and spatial variation are key features that make
unconditionally secure key generation using the common wireless channel possible.
In practice, although the radio channel is reciprocal, channel measurements are not
reciprocal because the radio-frequency electronics are often not reciprocal. Calibration must
be performed to eliminate this effect. Also, additive noise in the measurement impacts the
signal independently in each direction, and typically bi-directional channel measurements
are not made simultaneously. As a result of these practical considerations, differences in
channel estimates at the two nodes can lead to key disagreement. Despite these observations,
however, generating secret keys from the common wireless channel is still attractive and
feasible. Significant background work on this topic has appeared, including the theoretical
bound on the maximum size of the secret key generated from common randomness derived
as the secret key rate [6] or key capacity [9] as well as the proposal of various key generation
algorithms [11, 12, 14]. This is a major component of this dissertation and is discussed in
detail in Chapter 4.
2.5

Chapter Summary
This chapter considers an important issue concerning symmetric encryption techniques,

namely the problem of key distribution. After presenting a fundamental introduction to
symmetric encryption techniques, the chapter discusses several key distribution approaches,
including conventional key distribution with a key distribution center, key exchange using
public-key encryption techniques, and key generation from common randomness. Quantum
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key distribution with the BB84 protocol is used as an example of the latter technique, and
it is shown that this method is able to detect eavesdropping and generates an unconditionally secure key by using privacy amplification. Finally, this chapter concludes with a short
discussion on the possibility of key establishment using the common wireless channel. This
approach is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 3
A Stochastic Model of the Time-Variant MIMO Channel based on
Experimental Observations
Because the key establishment techniques discussed in this dissertation exploit the
common randomness available in the time-variant MIMO channel, it is first important for us
to understand the nature of this channel and, if possible, develop a physically realistic channel
model. This chapter focuses on this model development. Naturally, while this model directly
supports the work highlighted in this dissertation, an accurate time-variant MIMO channel
model has broader applicability to the study of MIMO communications.
The potential performance benefits associated with using MIMO communication in
multipath wireless channels have been clearly outlined in the literature [26]. When using
MIMO technology on devices operating in a time-varying channel, maintaining and using
accurate channel state information (CSI) for the communication becomes difficult, and the
resulting throughput benefits of the technology quickly degrade [27, 28]. However, these
temporal variations that produce undesirable system performance degradation can also be
beneficial, because greater variation indicates more randomness inherent in the channel which
possibly results in a larger secret key rate [6], especially when multiple antennas are used.
When attempting to quantify the performance impact of channel temporal variation, it is
therefore critical that the simulation model accurately capture the temporal as well as the
commonly-included spatial characteristics of the multipath channel.
There have been a few papers on modeling channel temporal behavior based on raytracing [29] or analytic models [30]. It has recently been shown that high accuracy can
be obtained by extracting the time-varying characteristics (departure and arrival angles and
gains) of multipath clusters [31] from measured data and generating a time-series of channel
matrices from these multipath cluster characteristics [28]. While this demonstration is useful,
the prior work in [28] is lacking in three key areas:
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1. The work extracts the deterministic multipath parameters from a specific measurement
and shows that the characteristics of a model based on these parameters matches the
characteristics of the original data. Effectively, this is merely a parameterization of the
measured data and is not a model useful for general simulation.
2. Despite the discussion in [28] that the multipath parameters can vary in time, the computational examples used represent fixed (average) multipath angle and gain characteristics
over the measurement window, with only the node position varying in time.
3. The work does not address the appearance (birth) and disappearance (death) of multipath clusters.
A more comprehensive look at time-varying multipath cluster parameters is given in [32],
although the final model assumes that the cluster parameters vary linearly with time (or node
displacement).
This chapter introduces a stochastic model for the time-varying multipath cluster parameters that overcomes the limitations outlined above. The model is based on the observed
statistical behavior of multipath clusters from an ensemble of measured data. The presentation first describes the approach for extracting the time-varying cluster characteristics from
measured MIMO data in an indoor environment. The extracted cluster parameter waveforms
are then used as a basis for an auto-regressive (AR) model [33] that can generate time-series
for the angle of departure (AOD), angle of arrival (AOA), and power gain of individual multipath clusters that match the measured data both in terms of statistical distribution, measured
by the probability density function (pdf), and temporal correlation. The resulting multipath
model can be used with different antenna topologies and node motion profiles to generate
time-series for the MIMO channel whose characteristics statistically match those of measured
channels. Computational examples performed with the aid of information theoretic measures
appropriate for time-variant MIMO channels reveal the model accuracy. While the model is
applied here to two-dimensional scenarios due to the nature of the supporting data, a discussion is included on how the model can be extended if three-dimensional propagation data is
available.
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3.1

Time-Varying Model Formulation
There are many approaches that could be used to model the time-variant MIMO chan-

nel. Perhaps the most straightforward approach would be to directly define the time evolution
of the channel matrix coefficients. However, there is no guarantee that such a direct model
would capture the spatial characteristics of the underlying multipath propagation, and therefore simulations with such a model may not accurately reveal the behavior of MIMO signaling
strategies operating in time-varying environments. The goal of this chapter is to provide a
model that correctly captures the bulk spatial behavior of the multipath propagation. Such
a model is useful for simulations involving mobile MIMO radios or nodes operating in an
environment with mobile scatterers.
Creating a model of the multipath channel time-variant behavior requires that we first
obtain an adequately detailed understanding of the physical behavior of real channels. When
obtaining this understanding from measured channel data, however, the difficulty becomes
determining how much physical detail is necessary to obtain reasonable model accuracy. For
example, it is possible to use high-bandwidth multi-antenna measurements to identify the
time-space characteristics of individual multipath components [34, 35], and a model that incorporates such behavior would presumably offer the highest accuracy. Unfortunately, such
measurements require very precise calibration for the results to be physically representative [36, 37], and the resulting number of parameters required to represent the behavior of the
high number of multipath components would be very large.
This observation suggests resorting to a simpler representation that still captures the
key channel physics. Arguably, models in which the multipath components are grouped together in space-time clusters provide such a representation [31, 38, 39]. These models have been
shown to provide a good statistical representation of multipath spatial and delay structure.
However, to date, the majority of the work assumes that the multipath cluster parameters
remain fixed in time. The goal of this work is to determine the time-variant behavior of these
cluster parameters and incorporate the observed characteristics into a time-variant model.
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3.1.1

Statistical Cluster Channel Modeling
In order to fully appreciate the modeling of the time-varying MIMO channel, a brief in-

troduction about statistical cluster models is helpful, particularly the Saleh-Valenzuela Model
with Angle (SVA) model [31, 40]. The foundational work on statistical cluster modeling [41]
demonstrated that multipath components can be grouped into clusters temporally and that
the cluster amplitudes decay exponentially with delay time. This statistical model for urban
multipath propagation has also been applied to indoor scenarios [42] by characterizing the
channel impulse response with time of arrival (TOA) and amplitude of the multipaths. The
SVA model extends these models by including the angle of arrival (AOA) and angle of departure (AOD) information [31] based on experimental observations that multipath arrivals are
clustered in both time and space.
We denote the multipaths within a cluster as rays, and express the channel impulse
response with Q clusters and L rays per cluster restricted on the horizontal plane (θT = θR =
π/2) as
Q

hcir

L

1 XX
′
βqℓ δ(τ − τq,ℓ
)δ(φT − φ′T,qℓ )δ(φR − φ′R,qℓ ),
=
QL q=1

(3.1)

ℓ=1

′
where τq,ℓ
= Tq + τq,ℓ , φ′T,qℓ = φT,q + φT,qℓ , φ′R,qℓ = φR,q + φR,qℓ . Tq , φT,q and φR,q represent

the initial TOA, mean AOD and mean AOA respectively of the qth cluster, and τq,ℓ , φT,qℓ
and φR,qℓ are the TOA, AOD and AOA of the ℓth ray within the qth cluster relative to Tq ,
φT,q and φR,q respectively. Taking the Fourier transform of hcir with respect to the delay
τ and assuming single-polarization array elements with radiation patterns eT,n (ω, φT ) and
eR,m (ω, φR ) for the nth transmit and mth receive antennas, we obtain the channel transfer
matrix in the frequency domain with elements
Q

L

1 XX
′
Hmn (ω) =
βqℓ e−jωτq,ℓ eT,n (ω, φ′T,qℓ)eR,m (ω, φ′R,qℓ),
QL q=1 ℓ=1

(3.2)

where the variable ω indicates the channel transfer function is frequency-dependent for wideband or frequency selective channels. However, for frequency nonselective or flat fading channels the variable ω can be dropped for simplicity.
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The SVA model defines the cluster and ray parameters as random variables obeying
a pre-determined distribution. The initial TOA of a cluster follows a conditional probability
density function (PDF) as
p(Tq |Tq−1 ) = Λτ e−Λτ (Tq −Tq−1 ) ,

(3.3)

with Tq > Tq−1 , T0 > 0, and Λτ is the parameter controlling the cluster arrival rate. Similarly,
the arrival time of the ℓth ray in the qth cluster obeys the distribution
p(τqℓ |τq,ℓ−1 ) = λτ e−λτ (τqℓ −τq,ℓ−1 ) ,

(3.4)

where τqℓ > τq,ℓ−1 , τ0 > 0, and λτ is the parameter controlling the ray arrival rate in a cluster.
The phase of the complex gain βqℓ is uniformly distributed on [0, 2π], and the magnitude is
Rayleigh distributed satisfying
E{|βqℓ |2 } = E{|β00 |2 }e−Tq /Γτ e−τqℓ /γτ ,

(3.5)

which means the amplitudes of the clusters as well as the amplitudes of the rays within a cluster
decay exponentially with time constants Γτ and γτ [40]. In a rich scattering environment, the
multipaths tend to depart and arrive in all directions. Therefore, the mean departure and
arrival angles φT,q and φR,q are assumed to be uniformly distributed on [0, 2π]. The ray angle
φγ,qℓ follows a two-sided Laplacian distribution given by
p(φγ,qℓ ) = √

1 −|√2φγ,qℓ /σφ |
e
,
2σφ

(3.6)

where σφ is the standard deviation of angle in radians, γ ∈ {T, R}.
Model implementation involves statistical realization of cluster parameters followed by
generation of the MIMO channel transfer matrix using (3.2) for the antennas of interest. The
goal of this work is to determine how these cluster parameters vary in time due to node or
scatterer motion. Generally, a multipath cluster is defined by its AOD, AOA, TOA, and gain.
This work focusses on narrowband channels, and therefore we can neglect the behavior of the
cluster arrival delay, although the basic modeling approach can be used to include delay if
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the data is available. The task in the remainder of this section is therefore to determine the
time-variant behavior of the three remaining cluster parameters.
3.1.2

Channel Measurements
Data for this study were collected with a prototype wideband channel sounder which

uses a switched-array architecture to probe 8×8 MIMO channels [28, 43]. In these measurements, the transmitter was placed in a central hallway, and the receiver was moved at a
constant speed of 31.75 cm/s along a straight line in eight different rooms adjacent to the
hallway (see [28, 43]). A detailed map of the measurements used appears in Fig. 2 of [28].
The antenna arrays were eight-element uniform circular arrays (UCA) composed of monopole
antennas with λ/2 interelement spacing. Measurements were taken at 2.55 GHz with 80 MHz
of instantaneous excitation bandwidth divided into bins with 10 MHz spacing. The channel
was sampled every 3.2 ms over a 2 s interval, resulting in a spatial sampling interval of 0.0086
wavelengths. The Nr × Nt matrix H(k) represents the channel matrix at the kth sample time,
where Nr and Nt respectively denote the number of receive and transmit antennas.
3.1.3

Parameter Extraction
Determining the double-directional power angular spectrum (PAS) [44] requires that we

construct the full spatial covariance for the channel. If the channel is wide-sense stationary,

this covariance can be computed as R = E hh† , where E{·} is the expectation taken

over time, h is the channel matrix stacked column-wise into a vector, and {·}† represents a
conjugate transpose. In our scenario, however, the multipath angular and gain characteristics
are time-variant, suggesting that wide-sense stationarity will be violated. Instead, we assume

the process is approximately wide-sense stationary, which in this work means that we can
estimate the covariance at each time sample by averaging over a reasonable window of NS
adjacent samples. We also assume the covariance remains constant over the measurement
bandwidth, allowing averaging over the NF samples in frequency as well. The covariance
estimate at the kth time sample can therefore be represented as

R

(k)

NX
F −1
1
=
NF (NS + 1) i=0
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NS /2

X

k ′ =−NS /2

(k+k ′ ) (k+k ′ )†
hi
,

hi

(3.7)
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of the PAS.

(k)

where hi

is the stacked channel matrix at the kth time sample and ith frequency. The

double-directional PAS, also known as the Bartlett beamformer, at the kth time sample is
then given by [44]
P (k) (φR , φT ) = c(k)† (φR , φT )R(k) c(k) (φR , φT ),
(k)

(k)

(3.8)

(k)

where c(n−1)M +m (φR , φT ) = ψR,m (φR )ψT,n (φT ) and φγ , γ ∈ {T, R}, is the azimuth angle
(k)

(k)

(k)

at transmit or receive. Also, ψγ,m (φγ ) = ejk0 (xγ,m cos φγ +yγ,m sin φγ ) , where k0 is the free-space
(k)

(k)

wavenumber and (xγ,m , yγ,m ) is the coordinate of the mth transmit or receive antenna at the
kth time sample. One example of the PAS is plotted in Fig. 3.1.
We next scale the time-variant PAS such that its maximum value over the angle-time
domain is unity and track the magnitude and angles of the peaks in the PAS, each of which
is designated as a single cluster, as a function of time sample. The tracking algorithm implementation identifies the appearance of new clusters (birth) and the disappearance of existing
clusters (death). This analysis produces the AOD, AOA, and power gain as a function of
time for each of the dominant clusters in each multipath scenario. Figure 3.2 illustrates one
example of the AOA, AOD and power gain time series derived from the measurement. Each
resulting time series is finally smoothed using a minimum velocity spline function [45] to re-
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Figure 3.2: One example of time series of AOA, AOD and power gain derived from the measurement.

move high frequency artifacts created by sampling, measurement noise, and cluster extraction
errors.
It is important to recognize that in this cluster identification, we only retain those
clusters whose peak magnitude (after scaling) rises above a value of 0.2. Imposing such
a threshold allows removal of artifacts incurred by estimation error in the covariance R(k)
which have been clearly identified in performance evaluations of the Bartlett beamformer [46].
Furthermore, observations of the PAS show that the parameters for the dominant clusters
vary more rapidly and more significantly than those for the smaller clusters, implying that
the larger and smaller clusters must each be described by different stochastic representations.
Fortunately, the work in [28] reveals that only a few (< 10) clusters are required to represent
90% of the energy in the PAS, and our analysis finds that the average power gain of the 10th
cluster (over all measurements) is 0.2. This indicates that for simplicity, it is reasonable to
neglect the clusters whose magnitude falls below the 0.2 threshold.
We further note that the modeling approach outlined in the following is not dependent upon this particular method for extracting the multipath cluster time-variant behaviors.
In fact, using high-resolution multipath data for extracting cluster characteristics arguably
provides a richer data set from which the model can be synthesized [38]. The key result of
28

the following is the introduction of a sophisticated approach for modeling cluster time variations based on observations from any experimental (or computational) channel measurement
campaign.
3.1.4

Parameter Stochastic Description
We now wish to represent the cluster parameters using a simple yet representative
(k)

stochastic description. Let ξγ,q represent the kth time sample (k ≥ 0) for the AOD (γ = T ),
AOA (γ = R), or power gain (γ = G) for the qth cluster. Each time series is converted to
h
i
(k)
(k)
(k)
a zero-mean, unit-variance sequence ηγ,q using the transformation ηγ,q = ξγ,q − µγ,q /σγ,q ,
2
where µγ,q and σγ,q
represent respectively the mean and variance of the relevant time series.

During this process, the statistics of the mean values µT,q and µR,q over all clusters from
all measurements are found to be uniformly distributed on [0, 360◦ ). The variances for the
2
2
AOD and AOA are σT,q
= 19.4◦ and σR,q
= 63.6◦ , which are derived numerically from the
(k)

(k)

transformations of the time series ξT,q and ξR,q respectively, with the larger AOA variance
resulting from the fact that the receiver is the moving node. For the power gain, the statistical
analysis produces the probability density function (pdf) of the mean as well as that of the
square root of the variance conditioned on the mean.
With these transformations, the AOD, AOA, and gain for all clusters can each be described by a single wide-sense stationary stochastic representation consisting of the probability
density function (pdf) approximated by a histogram and the power spectral density (PSD).
The solid curves in Fig. 3.3 show the zero-mean, unit-variance pdfs obtained by transforming the extracted data for the AOA, AOD, and power gain. This leaves us with the task of
estimating the PSD for each parameter.
To accomplish this estimation, we exploit the fact that the PSD can be written in the
form [33]
Pγ (z) = Hγ (z)Hγ∗ (1/z ∗ ),

(3.9)

where {·}∗ represents a conjugate. Assuming that Hγ (z) can be represented using an AR
model [33] leads to
Hγ (z) =

1 + aγ,1

z −1
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bγ
,
+ · · · + aγ,p z −p

(3.10)

where bγ and aγ,i , 1 ≤ i ≤ p, are unknown coefficients. Given a value for the order p (a method
for determining p is provided in Section 3.1.7), we use the covariance method [33] to estimate
the vector aγ = [aγ,1 , aγ,2 , · · · , aγ,p ]T , with {·}T indicating a transpose, by solving the system
Rγ aγ = −rγ ,

(3.11)

where rγ = [rγ (0, 1), rγ (0, 2), · · · , rγ (0, p)]T , Rγ,mn = rγ (n, m) for 1 ≤ m, n ≤ p, and
"
#
Kq −1
S
X
1
1X
(k−m)∗
rγ (m, n) =
ξ (k−n) ξγ,q
.
S q=1 Kq − p k=p γ,q

(3.12)

In these expressions, S is the total number of clusters obtained by applying the threshold 0.2
discussed in Section 3.1.3 over all measurements involved in the statistical analysis and Kq
represents the number of samples over which the qth cluster exists (survival time). Finally,
the coefficient bγ is calculated using
v
u
p
X
u
t
bγ = rγ (0, 0) +
aγ,i rγ (0, k).

(3.13)

i=1

The solid curves in Fig. 3.4 show the PSD produced by this analysis for the AOA, AOD, and
power gain using the order p = 3, 4, and 3 respectively.
3.1.5

Cluster Birth and Death
The processed measurement data also reveals information about how frequently a new

cluster appears and how long a cluster remains before disappearing in a propagation scenario,
referred to here as cluster birth and death, respectively. The top plot in Fig. 3.5 shows the
probability mass function (pmf) for cluster birth which represents probabilistically the number
of new clusters born at each time sample. This pmf is used in Section 3.1.8 to determine if
new clusters should be generated at each time sample. The bottom plot in Fig. 3.5 shows the
pmf of the cluster survival time Kq from the measurements. Based on this result, we model
Kq as a discrete random variable uniformly distributed on [20, 600].
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Figure 3.3: Zero-mean, unit-variance pdfs for the AOA, AOD, and power gain for the multipath
clusters obtained from the data as well as the stochastic time-varying model using 50 time series
each of 2000 samples.

3.1.6

Parameter Modeling
The goal is now to create a model which can generate time-series for the relevant

cluster parameters whose stochastic behavior matches that of the time series extracted from
the measured data. A wide-sense stationary process with power spectrum in the form of (3.9)
can be obtained by driving a linear, time-invariant system (filter) with frequency response
Hγ (z) with an appropriate zero-mean, unit-variance, temporally white noise process [33, 47].
If the system Hγ (z) is minimum phase and therefore invertible (which has been ensured by our
estimation of the PSD), we can obtain the appropriate white noise process as the output of the
filter with frequency response Hγ−1 (z) driven by the time-series extracted from the measured
data. The pdfs for the resulting white processes, referred to as the innovation processes χγ ,
become the “source” for the desired model. Figure 3.6 plots the pdf for each of the three
innovation processes decribing the different cluster parameters.
We are now prepared to create an AR model to synthetically generate the time-varying
multipath cluster parameters. For each cluster, one time series for each parameter, namely
the AOD, AOA, and power gain, is generated using the sequence of steps shown in the block
diagram of Fig. 3.7. The implementation of each step can be described as follows:
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Figure 3.4: Power spectra for the AOA, AOD, and power gain for the multipath clusters
obtained from the data as well as the stochastic time-varying model using 50 time series each of
2000 samples.

1. The value of Kq , the cluster survival time, is obtained as a realization of the pmf described in Section 3.1.5. Values of µγ,q , γ ∈ {T, R, G} and σG,q are also generated as
2
random numbers as described in Section 3.1.4. For AOD and AOA, we use σT,q
= 19.4◦

2
and σR,q
= 63.6◦ , although these can be reversed if the transmitter is mobile and the

receiver is stationary.
2. A temporally white process is created by generating Kq independent realizations of a
random variable drawn from the pdf describing the innovation process for the parameter.
3. The white process is passed through a filter with response Hγ (z) to obtain the zero-mean,
(k)

unit-variance temporally correlated process η̂γ,q .
4. The correlated sequence is scaled by σγ,q and then added to µγ,q to obtain the output
(k)
sequence ξˆγ,q .

Note that all of the information required to implement this model using the parameters drawn
from the measured data considered in this work appears either in the discussion in Sections 3.1.4 and 3.1.5 or in Appendix A. The dashed curves in Figs. 3.3 and 3.4 show the pdf
and PSD for the sequences taken at the output of the filter with response Hγ (z) from 50 time
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Figure 3.6: Innovation process pdfs for the AOA, AOD, and power gain used as inputs for the
time-varying stochastic multipath cluster model.

series each consisting of 2000 samples generated by the model compared to those obtained
from all measurement data for each of the three cluster parameters. Figure 3.8 plots one
realization of time series of AOA, AOD and power gain as the output at step 4.
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Figure 3.7: Block diagram describing the AR model used to generate the AOD, AOA, or power
gain of an individual cluster in the time-varying stochastic multipath model.
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Figure 3.8: One example of time series of AOA, AOD and power gain derived from the model.

3.1.7

Model Implementation Discussions
Three details of the model implementation deserve some attention. First, we demon-

strate the success of using the covariance method to derive the model parameters in (3.11)
instead of applying the commonly used autocorrelation method [33]. In the autocorrelation
method with real data, rγ (t) = rγ (m, n) = rγ (|m − n|) with t = |m − n|, 0 ≤ t ≤ p, and
"
#
Kq −1−t
S
X
1
1X
rγ (t) =
ξ (k+t) ξ (k) .
S q=1 Kq − t k=0 γ,q γ,q
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(3.14)
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Figure 3.9: PDFs of the zero-mean unit-variance AOA model outputs for different model order
p, using the autocorrelation method.

In this case, Rγ in Equation (3.11) is a toeplitz matrix. Solving (3.11) and (3.13) with
Rγ,mn = rγ (|m − n|) allows derivation of the parameters aγ and bγ . Figure 3.9 plots the PDFs
of the zero-mean unit-variance model outputs with γ = R for model order p = 2, 3, 4 using
the autocorrelation method as well as the PDF derived from the measurement. Similar PDF
curves are also obtained for other values of p. The plot indicates that no matter what the model
order p is, using the autocorrelation method fails to model the time series that matches with
the channel measurement. This disagreement occurs as a result of the windowing applied in
the autocorrelation method that zeros all data outside the window. In contrast, the covariance
method utilizes the available data without windowing [33], and therefore it generates model
outputs that match the measurements with a relatively small model order. Generally speaking,
for short data records the covariance method outperforms the autocorrelation method.
Second, realization of this model depends on proper creation of the filter Hγ (z) from the
measured data, which implies proper selection of the filter order p. Based on numerical trials,
(k)

we select the smallest value of the order p which enables η̂γ,q from the synthesis to match the
corresponding zero-mean, unit-variance correlated time series obtained from the measurements
(k)

(ηγ,q ). Figure 3.10 illustrates the PDFs of the zero-mean unit-variance correlated AOA model
outputs with p = 2, 3, 4 using the covariance method. Obviously, p = 3 should be selected as
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Figure 3.10: PDFs of the zero-mean unit-variance AOA model outputs for different model
order p, using the covariance method.

the model order for AOA, because the PDF derived with p = 3 is the best match to the PDF
obtained from measurement. Similarly, p = 4 and p = 3 are selected for AOD and power gain
respectively.
(k)
Third, it is important to mention that the generated power gain time series ξˆG,q will

occasionally drop below zero over a small interval because of the unavoidable error in estimating the conditional pdf of σG given the mean µG based on a limited number of available
samples. However, we have found that for our data, the probability of successfully generating
time series with non-negative power gains is higher than 0.92 (based on 10,000 numerical
trials), and we therefore simply discard any time series with negative power gains without
significant computational penalty.
3.1.8

MIMO Channel Synthesis
Now that we have developed a mechanism for modeling the time-varying behavior of

multipath spatial clusters, we can turn attention to using this framework within a more comprehensive model of the time-varying MIMO channel. We first must determine the number
of clusters Q(k) that exist at time sample k. For simplicity, we assume an initial number of
clusters Q(0) = 4, which is the average number of clusters derived from all the measurements,
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and subsequently use the cluster birth and death determination approach discussed in Section 3.1.5 to obtain Q(k) as the simulation continues. For each cluster, we generate the AOD,
AOA, and power gain as a function of time sample.
The remainder of the model generation follows the basic framework outlined in [28].
We approximate each cluster with L multipath components (rays). AOD φT,qℓ and AOA φR,qℓ
values for the ℓth ray in the qth cluster are each drawn from a zero-mean Laplacian distribution
with an angle spread of 26◦ based on the findings in [31, 39], resulting in a time-varying AOD
(k)
(k)
and AOA for each ray of φ̂γ,qℓ = ξˆγ,q + φγ,qℓ for γ ∈ {T, R}. Similarly, we compute the voltage

gain αqℓ of the ℓth ray in the qth cluster as a realization of a zero-mean, unit-variance complex
q
(k)
(k)
Gaussian random variable, producing the time-variant complex ray gain of β̂qℓ = ξˆG,q αqℓ .
(k)

To avoid abrupt changes in the channel, the gain sequence β̂qℓ is windowed to ensure a

smooth transition. If Kq < 40, the series is multiplied by a Hamming window of length Kq .
If Kq ≥ 40, the first and last 20 samples of the sequence are multiplied respectively by the
first and last half of a 40-length Hamming window. For the initial clusters, only the last 20
samples are windowed. With the multipath parameters described by these time series, the
synthetic channel matrix is then realized as

(k)
b mn
H

=p

1
Q(k) L

(k)

Q
L
X
X

(k)
β̂qℓ eR,m

q=1 ℓ=1



(k)
φ̂R,qℓ



(k)
ψR,m



(k)
φ̂R,qℓ







(k)
(k)
(k)
eT,n φ̂T,qℓ ψT,n φ̂T,qℓ ,

(3.15)

where eγ,m (φ) is the complex field radiation pattern for the mth transmit (γ = T ) or receive
(γ = R) antenna when it is sitting at the coordinate origin and it is important to emphasize
(k)

that ψγ,m depends explicitly on the time index k because of the time-variant antenna position
as well as the changing AOD/AOA of each path.
3.2

Model Performance
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 demonstrate that the cluster data from the model matches that

extracted from the experimental data in a statistical sense. However, it is also important that
we validate the time evolution of the channel matrices generated from the multipath data. The
multivariate nature of the channel matrix complicates efforts to perform this validation. In
this work, we adopt the approach taken in [28] of comparing the values of established measures
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for quantifying the level of MIMO channel time variation generated from the model to those
obtained directly from the measured channel matrices. These measures, which are detailed
in [28], quantify the information theoretic loss in performance caused by using outdated CSI in
the signaling strategy. More explicitly, the transmit capacity delay (TCD) approximates the
capacity loss that occurs at time sample k (channel matrix H(k) ) when the transmitter forms
its signaling strategy using the CSI at time sample 0 (channel matrix H(0) ). Mathematically,
the TCD at time sample k is defined as
CT (H(0) , H(k) ) = log2 |

H(k) RH(0) H(k)
+ I|,
ση2

(3.16)

where ση2 is the receiver noise covariance, RH(0) is the optimal water-filling transmit covariance
assuming H(0) as the current CSI.
Similarly, the receive capacity delay (RCD) approximates the capacity loss that occurs
when both the transmitter and receiver use outdated CSI in their signaling strategy. Assuming
that the transmitter and receiver form parallel Gaussian channels using the singular value
decomposition of the outdated CSI H(0) (H(0) = ÛŜV̂), we have

†

y = H(0) x + (H(k) − H(0) )x + η,
†

†

(3.17)
†

Û y = Ŝ(V̂ x) + Û (H(k) − H(0) )V̂(V̂ x) + Ûη,

(3.18)

where x and y are the signals transmitted and received, and η is the noise. The RCD is
derived from
CR (H(0) , H(k) ) = log2 |H(0) Rx H(0)† (Rz + Iσ 2 )−1 + I|,
†

†

(3.19)
†

where Rx = E{x′ x′† }, Rz = E{zz† }, x′ = V̂ x, and z = Û (H(k) − H(0) )V̂(V̂ x), the second
term on the right of (3.18).
On average, the TCD and RCD are computed as
NX
−k−1
1
Cγ (k) =
Cγ (H(n) , H(n+k)),
N − k n=0

where γ = {R, T } and N is the total number of samples.
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(3.20)

In the following computations, we assume that the transmit and receive antennas are
eight-element UCAs of monopoles (eR,m (φ) = eT,n (φ) = 1) identical to those used for the
measurements to allow comparisons between the experimental and simulated results. The
transmitter remains fixed during the simulation, while the receiver moves in a straight line.
For each channel realization, the time sequence of K channel matrices is normalized using
b (k) where
H(k) = ζ H

"

K−1
1 X b (k)
H
ζ=
KMN k=0

2

#−1/2

.

(3.21)

The total average transmit power and single-receive average noise power are then computed
to produce a single-input single-output signal-to-noise ratio of 10 dB [48].
Figure 3.11 plots the TCD normalized to a peak value of unity as a function of receiver
node displacement computed from both the measured (averaged over all measurements) and
modeled (averaged over 3000 channel realizations) data. This plot is interesting, since it reveals
that the model is accurate for short displacements up to about 10 cm even when cluster birth
and death is excluded. This suggests that over short displacements, the dominant effect is
simply the variation of the cluster angles and gains as well as motion of the node within
the environment. However, for larger displacements, cluster birth and death is required for
the model to maintain high accuracy, revealing the importance of this process in the channel
description.
Figure 3.12 plots the RCD, plotted versus electrical displacement (see [28] for the reasoning behind this choice) under the same circumstances outlined in connection with Fig. 3.11
with the exception that only 1000 channel realizations were necessary to obtain a statistically
valid result. In this case where both transmitter and receiver CSI are outdated, the capacity
drops dramatically with node displacement, revealing the high sensitivity to accurate receive
CSI discussed previously [28]. The model is able to capture this effect very accurately (with
or without cluster birth and death), suggesting that the dominant effect is the change in the
CSI due primarily to node motion and secondarily to the cluster variation.
3.3

Extension to Three Dimensions
The approach taken in this paper has concentrated on two-dimensional propagation

where the multipath departures and arrivals are confined to the horizontal plane since the
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Figure 3.11: Normalized average TCD metric as a function of receiver displacement computed
from the original measured data and the time-variant model.
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Figure 3.12: Normalized average RCD metric as a function of receiver displacement computed
from the original measured data and the time-variant model.

measurements used as a model basis have this limitation. Such an assumption is commonly
used in many environments and practical simulations. However, if a particular communication
scenario requires full three-dimensional characterization and the supporting measurements are
40

available which provide departure and arrival elevation and azimuth angle [49, 50], the basic
framework used here can be extended to accommodate this information.
(k)

Consider the scenario where the measurements provide ξG,q (the power gain time series)
(k)

(k)

as well as the elevation and azimuth time series θγ,q and φγ,q respectively for the AOD (γ = T )
(k)

and AOA (γ = R). The power gain time series ξG,q can be modeled using the approach
introduced in Section 3.1 without modification, and we therefore focus on modeling of the
h
iT
(k)
(k)
(k)
cluster angles. To do this, we form a vector ξγ,q = θγ,q φγ,q and transform it into a zero(k)

mean time series η γ,q by subtracting the mean µγ,q . We then model this time series with a
vector AR model [51] according to
η (k)
γ,q

=

p
X

Φγ,j η (k−j)
+ u(k)
γ,q
γ ,

(3.22)

j=1

(k)

where p is the order of the vector AR model, Φγ,j is a coefficient matrix, and uγ is a white
(k) †

(k)

(k)

(l) †

noise vector with covariance Σ(k)
γ = E{uγ uγ } which satisfies E{uγ uγ } = 0 for k 6= l. We
assume the white noise vectors of all clusters share the same statistical characteristics, which
(k)

(k)

accounts for the lack of subscript q in uγ . We also note that uγ is the vector equivalent to
the scalar innovation process discussed in Section 3.1.
The coefficient matrices Φγ,j , j = 1, 2, . . . , p, and Σ(k)
are estimated by the least
γ
(k)

squares estimation method [51] given the time series η γ,q . For simplicity, we assume that the
covariance of uγ (k) is time invariant or Σ(k)
γ = Σγ . Determination of Φγ,j and Σγ then allows
(k)

determination of the white noise vector uγ
(k)

(k)

using (3.22). Next, the vector uγ is whitened

(k)

(k) (k)†

with the transformation ũγ = V†uγ such that E{ũγ ũγ } = Λ, where V and Λ are the
eigenvectors and eigenvalues from the decomposition Σγ = VΛV†. Since the two elements in
(k)

ũγ are uncorrelated, it is simple to estimate their pdfs using a histogram.
Based on these stochastic descriptions derived from the data, we generate two independent random processes from the pdfs discussed above, stack them into a vector ũγ , and
transform this to a correlated vector using ûγ = Vũγ . The procedures outlined in Section 3.1.6
can then be used with the vector AR model (3.22) and the estimated coefficient matrices to
(k)

produce the modeled output vector ξ̂ γ,q containing the elevation and azimuth angles. The

41

channel matrices are finally realized following the procedure of Section 3.1.8 with appropriate
modifications to (3.15) for including the elevation angles.
3.4

Chapter Summary
This chapter has demonstrated the implementation of a time-variant multipath chan-

nel model for MIMO applications. The model formulation uses measured channel data to
determine the statistical representation of the time-variant multipath cluster characteristics
followed by an AR model generation of cluster realizations whose statistics match those observed for the data. This time-variant multipath description is then used to generate a realistic
temporal evolution of the MIMO channel matrix given moving nodes. The model includes
the ability to have new clusters appear and existing clusters disappear. Comparisons of
the information theoretic MIMO performance as a function of time obtained using modeled
and measured data show that the model is highly accurate, particularly if cluster birth and
death is included. The stochastic modeling approach can be conveniently extended to threedimensional propagation by replacing the scalar AR model with the vector one.
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Chapter 4
Secret Key Establishment Using Temporally and Spatially Correlated Wireless Channel Coefficients
Armed with an improved understanding and a model of the time-variant MIMO channel, we are ready to explore the establishment of secret keys using the common randomness
available in this channel. A variety of algorithms have been proposed to generate secret keys
by extracting randomness existing in the common wireless channel either in a narrowband
or wideband system [16, 11, 14]. Most prior work has assumed that these channel samples
are temporally white and obtained from a SISO system, and therefore considers neither the
impact of temporal and spatial correlation within the channel matrices on the key generation
performance nor the practical issues associated with whitening of these samples. This chapter
carefully considers the use of temporally and spatially correlated channel samples for secret
key establishment based on physically-observed properties of the time-variant MIMO channel.
To place the contributions of the work into the broader research arena of physical layer
security, we first provide an overview of physical layer security. The remainder of the chapter
focuses on secret key establishment using the wireless channel between the two legitimate
nodes as common randomness. After introducing the system model, the treatment begins by
using a simple channel model to examine the impact of correlation on the bound of the secret
key length and to verify the existence of an efficient sampling approach able to generate a
key with fixed length using the shortest possible sampling distance (or time). The discussion
then turns to practical methods for decorrelating measured channel samples, techniques for
efficiently generating key bits from these samples as introduced in [18], and error correction
using LDPC codes for reducing the KER of the keys established at the two nodes. Simulations
based on real channel measurements confirm the observations made using the simple channel
model and enable comparison between the performance of the practical algorithm with that
predicted by the analytical bound.
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4.1

Physical Layer Security
The security of wireless networks is gaining increased attention as wireless products and

services are becoming popular and pervasive due to easy and flexible access to the network.
The ultimate security goal in the physical layer is to accomplish extremely low probability of
intercept and probability of detection with respect to unauthorized eavesdroppers to achieve
data integrity, confidentiality, and user authentication. Generally, methods for achieving physical layer security can be categorized as either code-based or channel-related techniques. A
typical example of code-based techniques is spread-spectrum modulation [3], which hides the
confidential information into the background noise of a broadband system by using a pseudorandom sequence as a secret code, with the secrecy of the information achieved depending
on the privacy of the spread code. On the other hand, channel-related techniques are further
separated into three groups:
1. Secure-beamforming

A beamforming weight is selected based on the instantaneous

channel information, either to randomize the received signals for the eavesdroppers [1],
or to focus the transmitted power temporally and spatially on the intended receiver
by prefiltering the transmitted signal with the complex conjugated and time reversed
channel impulse response [2].
2. Degradation of the eavesdroppers’ channels

A portion of the transmit power is allo-

cated to transmit useful information to the intended receiver, while the remainder of
the power is used to broadcast artificial noise lying in the null space of the intended receiver’s channel, which leads to a degradation of the eavesdroppers’ channels but causes
negligible impact on the signal received by the authorized receiver [52, 4].
3. Key generation using the physical channel information

The secret key establishment

approaches using the reciprocal wireless channel as common randomness distill secret
keys either by quantizing the phase [14], real part or imaginary part of the channel
coefficient [18], or by transmitting some random information to the intended receiver to
establish the key [17].
To give a flavor of physical layer security, an example of secure beamforming techniques is provided in Section 4.1.1, but the remainder of the chapter is focused on secret
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key generation from the common wireless channel. We note that although there have been a
large number of techniques proposed to accomplish communication security, the data encryption/decryption approach remains the most widely used method because of its implementation
simplicity and its ability to provide multiple functionalities such as authentication, confidentiality, and integrity, an observation that motivates current and future research on secret key
establishment.
4.1.1

An Example of Secure Beamforming Techniques
To illustrate secure beamforming, this section discusses a transmit precoding technique

that finds a beamforming vector to achieve the goal of focusing the power on the legitimate
node and minimizing the power delivered to the eavesdropper, based on a multiple-input
single-output (MISO) system with Nt transmit antennas and Nr = 1 receive antenna for both
the authorized receiver and eavesdropper. Recall that we designate Alice and Bob as the
legitimate nodes, and Eve as the eavesdropper. The signals received by Bob and Eve are
respectively expressed as
yb = hTb wx + ηb ,

(4.1)

ye = hTe wx + ηe ,

(4.2)

where hb and he are the channel vectors from Alice to Bob and Eve respectively, w is a
beamforming vector, ηb and ηe are the received complex Gaussian white noise with variance
ση2 , and x is the transmitted signal. A power ratio metric
|hTb wx|2
|hTe wx|2
w† h∗ hT w
= † b∗ Tb ,
w he he w

γ=

(4.3)

where {·}∗ denotes conjugate operation, characterizes the spatial focusing effect of the power
delivered to Bob and Eve. A straightforward observation of the power ratio metric is that a
large γ indicates that Bob’s receive power is much higher than that of Eve.
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Applying the beamforming technique to achieve security, we first obtain the minimum
SNR required to reliably decode the signal transmitted, represented as SNRmin , with the SNR
defined as SNR = P/Nt ση2 , where P is the transmit power. In the scenario where γ > 1 is
satisfied, Alice has the freedom to adjust the transmit power P to guarantee that Bob is able
to detect the signals reliably while Eve’s SNR is too low for reliable detection. To accomplish
this, Alice ensures that SNRb > SNRmin and SNRe < SNRmin are satisfied, where SNRb and
SNRe are respectively Bob and Eve’s received SNR. Assuming that ηb and ηe have the same
variance, SNRe < SNRmin is equivalent to SNRb < γSNRmin . Therefore, security is ensured
when the transmit power P satisfies
ση2 Nt SNRmin < P < γση2 Nt SNRmin .

(4.4)

For a fixed transmit power satisfying (4.4), increasing γ implies decreasing SNRe , representing
a desirable degradation of the eavesdropper’s channel.
The eigen-beamforming technique using the singular value decomposition (SVD) to
form independent parallel eigenchannels to achieve optimal communication performance is
well understood [48]. This technique maximizes the channel capacity by allocating the transmit power according to the singular values of the channel. In a MISO system the eigenchannel
corresponding to the non-zero singular value (the others are zero) is selected to deliver power
to the receiver, and the transmit beamforming weight is chosen to be the singular vector corresponding to the non-zero singular value. Even without any knowledge of the eavesdropper,
using eigen-beamforming to transmit signal achieves some gain of spatial focusing, since the
eigen-beamforming approach maximizes the power delivered to the intended receiver. In this
case the secure beamforming weight w is chosen to be the singular vector corresponding to
the only non-zero singular value of the channel hb .
Another approach for deriving the beamforming weight is to directly maximize the
power ratio γ in equation (4.3), and we denote this technique as generalized eigen-beamforming.
One trivial solution is in the scenario where the eavesdropper’s channel he is known. The
weight is found to be a vector in the null-space of h∗e hTe . We apply the eigen decomposition to the semi-definite matrix h∗e hTe = VeΛe V†e, where Λe = diag(λe , 0, . . . , 0) and Ve =
b e = [v2e , . . . , vNt e ],
[v1e v2e . . . vNt e ] is the eigen-vector matrix. The null-space of h∗e hTe is V
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since h∗e hTe is a rank-one matrix. To compute the weight w, we first solve
†

b h∗ hT V
b e c,
c0 = arg max c† V
e b b
c

(4.5)

subject to kck = 1. The solution c0 is simply the eigenvector corresponding to the largest
b † h∗ hT V
b e . The beamforming weight is then given as
eigenvalue of V
e b b
b e c0 .
w=V

(4.6)

In this ideal situation, the power ratio γ is ∞ and no power is delivered to Eve, since
the transmitted signal is in Eve’s nullspace. When the covariance of Eve’s channel is known
to Alice instead of the instantaneous channel state information (CSI), (4.3) becomes
w† h∗b hTb w
,
γR =
w † Re w

(4.7)

where Re = E{h∗e hTe }. If Re is rank-deficient, a solution similar to (4.6) is found. Otherwise,
the weight w maximizing γR in (4.7) is the eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue
of the generalized eigen problem h∗b hb w = λRe w.
The channel measurements discussed in Section 3.1.2 are used to simulate the performance of the eigen-beamforming as well as the generalized eigen-beamforming techniques.
For the first transmit location in the hallway we pick the first receive location as Bob and the
second location as Eve. We assume that both Bob and Eve move along a line at the respective
locations, and only Eve’s covariance is known to Alice, estimated as the numerical approximation from the channel state information over a window of 10 temporal samples and all the
frequency bins. The eigen-beamforming weight and the generalized eigen-beamforming weight
maximizing (4.7) are applied separately, and the respective power ratio γ is calculated according to (4.3). Since the measurements were taken with MIMO channel sounders, we choose
the channel coefficients of all the transmit antennas to one receive antenna to form a MISO
channel. The performance results are averaged over all the available receive antennas. The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of γ is plotted in Fig. 4.1 for both the eigen-beamforming
(denoted as EBF) and generalized eigen-beamforming (denoted as GEBF) techniques, which
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Figure 4.1: CDF of the power ratio γ using eigen-beamforming (EBF) and generalized eigenbeamforming (GEBF) techniques.

demonstrates that both techniques are able to focus the power on the intended receiver, with
the generalized eigen-beamforming outperforming the eigen-beamforming. However, the stringent requirement of the generalized eigen-beamforming technique that the covariance or the
CSI of the eavesdropper’s channel is known makes it generally infeasible and impractical. As
a result, we focus attention on the encryption, and specifically key establishment, for the
remainder of this chapter.
4.2

System Model for Secret Key Establishment
Consider a system with a stationary transmitter and a receiver moving at a constant

speed v along a straight line, where the transmitter and receiver respectively have Nt and Nr
antennas. As the receiver moves, both nodes generate samples of the communication channel
transfer function at the time interval ∆τ , which can easily be related to the distance d = v∆τ
moved by the receiver between samples. Once the system has acquired K successive samples,
the acquisition process pauses until the receiver moves beyond the coherence distance Lc as
illustrated in Fig. 4.2, where the coherence distance is defined as Lc = vTc and Tc is the channel
coherence time. This ensures that correlation exists only within the segment of K adjacent
samples and not across samples in different segments, and it represents a generalization of
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Figure 4.2: Model illustrating the channel sampling process with K successive samples in a
sampling segment.

the sampling discussed in [16, 17, 18] in which only temporally white samples are considered
(K = 1).
(t)

Let the Nr × Nt matrix Hk represent the kth channel sample in the tth sampling
segment with k = 0, . . . , K − 1 and t = 0, 1, . . . , T0 − 1 for the communication link from the
transmitter to the receiver. It is straightforward to show that the channel sample for the
(t)

(t)

(t)T

reverse link from the receiver to the transmitter (denoted as H̄k ) is H̄k = Hk , where {·}T
(t)

(t)

denotes matrix transpose. Let hk = vec{Hk } for the link from the transmitter to the receiver
(t)

(t)T

and hk = vec{H̄k } for the link from the receiver to the transmitter, where vec{·} denotes
the columnwise-stacking operation. The vector containing all channel coefficients in the tth
(t)T

sampling segment for both links is h(t) = [h0

(t)T

h1

(t)T

. . . hK−1 ]T . Assuming the channel

is statistically stationary during the sampling process, we observe that h(0) , h(1) , . . . , h(T0 −1)
are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). Therefore, the superscript is dropped for
convenience and we use h to denote the channel vector in a sampling segment.
Now, suppose the two legitimate nodes, designated as Alice and Bob, sample the channel using the approach discussed above in an insecure environment and in the presence of
an eavesdropper, designated as Eve, as illustrated in Fig. 4.3. Through training, Alice and
Bob estimate the channel vector within the sampling segment, with these estimates denoted
respectively as
ha = h + ∆ha ,

(4.8)

hb = h + ∆hb ,

(4.9)
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Figure 4.3: Model illustrating the communication between two legitimate nodes Alice and Bob
in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve.

where h is the true channel vector and ∆ha and ∆hb are channel estimation errors consisting
of i.i.d. zero-mean complex Gaussian random variables with variance σn2 . We assume that Eve
can also estimate her channels to Alice and Bob, which are respectively represented as hea and
heb . For simplicity, we further assume that Eve is a passive eavesdropper without modifying or
inserting fraudulent messages into the information transmitted through the common channel.
If this is not the case, unconditionally secure authentication techniques [53] must applied
to guarantee an authenticated public channel, requiring that Alice and Bob initially share a
short secret key. Theoretical fundamentals for secret key generation over an unauthenticated
channel are provided in [54], and therefore a future extension of the work presented in this
paper is its application to this scenario.
4.3
4.3.1

Bound on Key Length
Mathematical Definition
The secret key rate is the maximum key length (in bits) that Alice and Bob can achieve

when the keys at the two nodes are generated from the common randomness. In this analysis,
the common wireless channel serves as the common randomness, and therefore the upper
bound on the key length is equal to the mutual information of the channel estimates ha and
hb conditioned on Eve’s channel estimates [6], or
IB = I(ha ; hb |hea , heb ).
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(4.10)

In a rich scattering environment, the channel varies rapidly with time and spatial
position, and as a result it is generally assumed that the common channel h and therefore ha
and hb are independent of hea and heb provided that Eve is sufficiently far away from both
Alice and Bob. Of course, if this independence is not achieved, then Eve may have information
that can be exploited to reduce the security of the key. To explore this, consider the case of
SISO channels (Nt = Nr = 1) where the channel coefficients can be described as wide-sense
stationary Gaussian random processes, an assumption that has been verified by experimental
measurements [55]. We assume that Eve is far from Bob but close to Alice so that ha and
hb are independent of hea but are correlated with heb (note that we have dropped the vector
notation as these channel coefficients are scalar random variables). We assume the well-known
Jakes’ correlation [56] described by the function
ρ(d0 ) = J0 (2πd0 /λ),

(4.11)

where J0 (·) is the zero-order Bessel function, λ is the wavelength of the communication, and
d0 is the distance between Alice and Eve. In this case, the disclosure of information to Eve
regarding the key is bounded by
Ie = I(ha ; heb ).

(4.12)

Figure 4.4 plots this mutual information as a function of the distance d0 , revealing that
Ie is negligible when d0 is sufficiently large (i.e. several wavelengths), or equivalently that ha
is independent of heb . Based on this observation, throughout the remainder of this paper, we
assume that the node separation is large enough that Eve’s channel estimates are independent
of the common channel, which allows (4.10) to be simplified as
IB = I(ha ; hb ).

(4.13)

More generally, if we assume that 1) the channel samples satisfy a zero-mean complex
joint-Gaussian distribution with covariance R = E{hh† } with E{·} and {·}† respectively
denoting an expectation and a matrix conjugate transpose and 2) ha and hb are independent
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Figure 4.4: The information potentially disclosed to Eve as a function of the distance d0
between Eve and Alice.

of hea and heb , the bound can be expressed as
IB = log2
=

N
X
i=1

|R + σn2 I|
|R + σn2 I − R(R + σn2 I)−1 R|

log2

1

1−

λi /σn2 2
( 1+λ
2)
i /σn

,

(4.14)

where N = Nt Nr K, | · | denotes the determinant of a matrix, and λi is the ith eigenvalue of
the covariance.
This result demonstrates that under these conditions, the bound depends on the distribution of the eigenvalues of the channel covariance and is maximized when the eigenvalues
are equal. This distribution is determined by the correlation among the entries in the channel
vector, which specifically represents temporal and spatial correlation created by the physical
propagation and sampling characteristics. Motivated by this observation, we consider the
secret key rate for a SISO channel, again assuming the correlation function of (4.11) but with
d0 = d representing the sample interval. The correlation distance Lc is the value of d0 achieving
the first zero of the Bessel function. Using this model, the covariance R of the channel vector h
within a sampling segment has a Toeplitz structure with elements Rmn = J0 (2π|m−n|d/λ) for
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Figure 4.5: (a) Channel sampling within a window size of the coherence distance with an
increasing number of samples and equal intervals. (b) Channel sampling with a fixed interval
and an increasing number of samples.

m, n = 0, 1, . . . , K − 1. For a fixed channel estimation signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) computed

using SNR = tr{R}/Kσn2 where tr{·} is the trace, the bound can be calculated using (4.14).
Although this channel model is simplistic, it allows a straightforward parametric representation of correlation, and the resulting analysis enables observation of fundamental relationships
between secret key rate and correlation.
4.3.2

Fixed Segment Length
Consider first the case in which all K channel samples are uniformly distributed within

the coherence distance Lc such that d = Lc /(K − 1), as illustrated in Fig. 4.5(a). As we
explore this case, it is interesting to evaluate the bound on the secret key rate in a general
context. Specifically, the correlation among the samples could be exploited by combining
multiple adjacent samples into a single sample, leading to a smaller number of samples each
with increased SNR. Therefore, let the downsampled channel sequence in the tth sampling
segment be given generally as
(t)
h̄s

W −1
1 X (t)
=
h
,
W w=0 w+W s

(4.15)

where s = 0, 1, . . . , S − 1,, K = W S and W is the number of averaged samples. Using this
downsampled sequence in place of the original channel sequence in the procedure outlined in
Sections 4.2 and 4.3.1 allows computation of (4.14) for this scenario.
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Figure 4.6 plots the key rate as a function of the number of samples K within a
segment for different averaging windows W and with SNR = 20 dB for the simple SISO
model with Bessel correlation. As a first observation, the curve for W = 1 reveals that for a
relatively small number of samples, the key rate increases dramatically with K, indicating that
simply taking widely-spaced and therefore uncorrelated samples (K = 1) limits the efficiency
of the key-establishment protocol since additional information (or randomness) is obtained
by each subsequent correlated sample. However, once the channel sampling becomes dense,
each additional sample provides little additional information regarding the channel, resulting
in a diminishing slope in the curve. As a second observation, because the curve for W = 1
achieves the largest key rate, these results demonstrate that averaging for SNR enhancement is
a suboptimal technique. However, when K is large, meaning that adjacent samples are highly
correlated, averaging a few adjacent samples can provide near-optimal performance. We note
that unless W = K, a scenario that delivers poor performance, the downsampled channels
still have residual correlation that must be accommodated in the actual key construction
algorithm. Based on these observations, we focus strictly on methods for creating keys from
correlated samples, recognizing that these techniques can be used whether or not some type
of SNR-enhancement filtering is used.
4.3.3

Fixed Sampling Interval
Consider next the situation in which the sampling interval d is fixed such that the total

distance within a segment increases with K, as demonstrated in Figure 4.5(b). The top plot
in Fig. 4.7 shows the average key rate per sample as a function of K for two different sampling
intervals d with SNR = 20 dB for the simple SISO model with Bessel correlation. This
result reveals that when K is relatively small, the number of bits per sample decreases with
increasing K due to the redundancy of information contained within the added samples. In
contrast to the results shown in Fig. 4.6, however, because the total sample window increases
with K, additional samples always add additional information and therefore bits to the key,
with the bits per sample approaching a constant as K → ∞. Finally, this plot confirms that
a larger sample interval d (and therefore total length of the sample window) provides more
information and therefore leads to a larger bound.
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Figure 4.6: Bound as a function of the number of samples K within a segment assuming
SNR = 20 dB and for different sample averaging windows W . All K samples reside within the
coherence distance, and the simulations use the simple SISO channel model.

Given this behavior of the bound, it is interesting to consider the total distance over
which samples must be taken to achieve a specified total key length Lkey given a fixed sample
interval d and number of samples K within each segment. With reference to Fig. 4.2, given
that IB represents the number of bits obtained from each segment of K samples, the number
of required segments is expressed as Ns = ⌈Lkey /IB ⌉, where ⌈·⌉ indicates an integer ceiling
function. For simplicity, we assume that if any samples are required in the final segment, the
total distance includes the entire length of that segment. Therefore, the total distance D over
which the receiver must travel to achieve a key of length Lkey is given as
D = Ns (K − 1)d + (Ns − 1)Lc ,

(4.16)

where we emphasize that the channel characteristics are implicitly included in IB and Lc .
The bottom plot of Fig. 4.7 plots D versus K for two values of d when Lkey = 128 bits
and SNR = 20 dB. We immediately observe that the plot is not monotonic and is characterized
by abrupt reductions in the distance as K increases. These discontinuities occur under the
situation where increasing K by one sample enables us to reduce the number of segments Ns
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Figure 4.7: Top: Bound versus the number of samples when the samples are obtained with
fixed sample intervals. Bottom: The distance required to obtain 128 bits with different number
of samples within a segment. The simulations use SNR = 20 dB with the simple SISO channel
model.

required to achieve the key and therefore to reduce the total distance D. We note that if
we were to include the fractional distance required rather than the total distance associated
with the last segment, these discontinuities would still occur because they involve removal
of one guard interval (of length Lc ) between sampling segments, although the height of the
discontinuity would be reduced.
The curves in the bottom plot of Fig. 4.7 reveal a more important behavior from the
standpoint of practical implementation. Specifically, the curve for each sample interval d
demonstrates a value of K for which the total distance D is minimized, and since in our
scenario distance and time are dependent variables (the receiver is moving at velocity v), a
minimum distance moved represents the minimum time required to establish the desired key.
This indicates that a system can manipulate its sampling to minimize the key establishment
time. Furthermore, the fact that the optimal value of K is larger than one reinforces the idea
that the addition of correlated samples is advantageous in the key establishment protocol.
Finally, we emphasize that while our results focus on sampling a static channel as a
function of receiver position, the analysis applies to the case of static nodes sampling a channel
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whose time variation is created by moving scatterers. However, we recognize that for most
environments, only a small number of the scatterers move, leading to more stability in the
channel temporal response and therefore longer coherence times. Furthermore, because we
have emphasized spatial sampling, the analysis can be applied to systems that sample the
channel using multiple antennas.
4.4

Channel Decorrelation
While the information theoretic analysis of Section 4.3 analyzes the achievable key rate

given the channel correlation characteristics, it does not indicate how to practically achieve this
rate. If some type of channel quantization is used, the challenge is to ensure that the underlying
variables are uncorrelated before quantization. One straightforward way to eliminate the
spatial and temporal correlation between the channel coefficients is to use the eigenvectors
of the full covariance R of the channel vector h. Specifically, if R = UΛU† where U is the
unitary matrix of eigenvectors and Λ is the diagonal matrix of eigenvalues with Λii = λi , we
can apply the transformation
ĥ = U† h,

(4.17)

so that Λ represents the covariance of ĥ. Because the elements of h and therefore ĥ satisfy a
joint Gaussian distribution, the uncorrelated elements of ĥ are independent.
While this channel decorrelation process is conceptually simple, the number of floating
operations required for the eigen-decomposition of an N × N matrix scales as N 3 [57]. When
N is large (for example, when K is large), this computation can be significant. Motivated
by this observation, it might be tempting to simplify the computation by assuming that
the spatial and temporal correlations are separable, as is sometimes done in MIMO channel
modeling [28]. However, before blindly incorporating this separability into the decorrelation
process, we must ensure that the resulting vector ĥ truly has independent elements. Otherwise,
the key generated by quantizing this vector will have statistically correlated bits and therefore
will suffer from reduced security.
To analyze the independence resulting from assuming space-time separability during
covariance construction, we perform the decorrelation using the following steps:
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1. We estimate the Nt Nr × Nt Nr spatial covariance using Rs =

1
T0 K

PT0 −1 PK−1
t=0

k=0

(t)

(t)†

hk hk ,

which has an eigen-decomposition Rs = Us Λs U†s . We then compute the Nt Nr × 1 vector
(t)

(t)

ȟk = U†s hk .

2. We construct the K × 1 temporally correlated vector
(t)

h̃(t)
m

(t)

where ȟk,m is the mth element of ȟk , m = 1, 2, . . . , Nt Nr .

h
iT
(t)
(t)
(t)
= ȟ0,m ȟ1,m . . . ȟK−1,m ,

3. We estimate the K × K temporal covariance using Rt =

1
T0 Nt Nr

PT0 −1 PNt Nr
t=0

m=1

(t)†
h̃(t)
m h̃m

† (t)
†
and form the uncorrelated vector h′(t)
m = Ut h̃m , where Rt = Ut Λt Ut .

h
iT
(t)
(t)
(t)
4. We construct the N × 1 uncorrelated channel vector ĥ(t) = h′ 1 h′ 2 . . . h′ Nt Nr .
Because the channel vectors from different sample segments are independent, the superscript can be dropped for convenience.
We emphasize that under this assumption of separability, the eigen-decomposition of the large
N × N covariance matrix is replaced by the eigen-decomposition of two smaller matrices,
with the resulting computational complexity reduced (relative to decorrelation using the full
covariance) by the factor (Nt Nr K)3 /[(Nt Nr )3 + K 3 ]. For Nt = Nr = 2 and K = 10, the
computation is reduced by 98.3%.
To evaluate the independence of the elements of ĥ, we apply the statistical independence test described in [58]. For this process, we first estimate the covariance of ĥ using
P 0 −1 (t) (t)†
R̂ = E{ĥĥ† } = T10 Tt=0
ĥ ĥ . The null hypothesis of the statistical test indicating that
all the variables in the vector are mutually independent is H0 : R̂pq = 0 for p 6= q, or
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(4.18)

We construct the likelihood ratio statistic as
u=

|R̂|

R̂11 R̂22 · · · R̂N N
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,

(4.19)

and transform u using


1
u = − µ − (2N + 5) ln u,
6
′



(4.20)

which has an approximate χ2f -distribution, where µ = T0 − 1 and f = N(N − 1)/2 represent

the number of degrees of freedom of R̂ and χ2 respectively. The hypothesis H0 is rejected with
significance level α if u′ > χ2α,f . Intuitively, if the correlation between the elements of ĥ is
small, u is close to 1 and u′ is close to 0, meaning that the vector passes the independence test
with high probability. If, however, the correlation is very high, u is close to 0, u′ approaches
infinity, and the vector fails the independence test.
To determine whether or not real channels can be decorrelated using the space-time
separability assumption, we apply this independence test to time-variant MIMO channel data
acquired with an experimental measurement system on the 4th floor of the Clyde Engineering Building at Brigham Young University. In these measurements, the transmit and receive
arrays are uniform circular arrays (UCA) composed of 8 vertically polarized monopoles with
half-wavelength interelement spacing. The system operates at a center frequency of 2.55 GHz,
and the signal consists of 80 frequency tones with 1 MHz separation. The transmitter was
placed at one of two different locations in the hallway and was stationary during the measurement. Measurements were taken with the receiver at eight different locations, and for each
location the receiver was moved at a constant speed of 32 cm/s along a straight line. Channels were sampled at an interval of 3.2 ms for a total sample time of about 2 s. The Doppler
spectrum of this data has a 3-dB bandwidth of Bd = 5 Hz, resulting in a channel coherence
time of Tc = 1/Bd = 0.2 s and channel coherence distance of Lc = vTc = 0.54λ. Additional
details regarding the measurement campaign and resulting data are provided in [28].
We use 2 × 2 subsets of the 8 × 8 channel matrices with K = 2 and d equal to the
distance between adjacent samples. Given the relatively short temporal channel measurement
window, we apply the measurements in different frequency bins instead of different temporal
(f )

segments in the test. Therefore, let Hk

represent the channel matrix at the kth sample
(f )

time and the f th frequency bin, and let hk

(f )

= vec{Hk }. We then apply the separable

decorrelation procedure given by steps 1) - 4) above using F = 80 frequency tones indexed
by 0 ≤ f < F rather than T0 temporal segments indexed by 0 ≤ t < T0 . When we apply
the independence test to the resulting decorrelated vector using a significance level α = 5%
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over 16 measurements consisting of two measurements in each of the eight different receiver
locations, we find that 100% of the data fails the test.
This analysis suggests that decorrelation should be performed using the full covariance
matrix to ensure that the resulting key is characterized by independent bits. We emphasize
that this finding is not particularly limiting in practical application, since at reasonable node
speeds and processor capabilities, the time required to acquire the necessary channel samples
is far greater than that required for the decorrelation computation. Rather, the significance
of this analysis lies in the fact that it guides potential system designers away from a practical
and common separability simplification.
4.5
4.5.1

Key Establishment
Coefficient Quantization Algorithm
As mentioned in the Introduction, methods for generating secret keys by quantizing the

common wireless channel have been proposed in recent literature [16, 11, 18, 19, 14, 13]. In this
paper, we focus on the ability to generate keys with narrowband channels, and therefore do
not consider methods for quantizing the channel impulse response measured with a wideband
system. However, we emphasize that the decorrelation analysis and techniques discussed in
this paper could be applied to accommodate correlation in frequency or delay and therefore
are relevant to wideband channels. Furthermore, because methods such as that described
in [14] which quantizes the channel coefficient phase disregard a portion of the available
information (in this case, channel coefficient magnitude), they are less efficient in their ability
to generate long keys. Therefore, we focus attention on methods that consider the entire
channel coefficient.
Specifically, the algorithm we consider here operates by quantizing the real and imaginary parts of the channel coefficients separately under the assumption that they are independent [18], and is referred to as the channel quantization alternating (CQA) scheme. Generating
log2 Q bits per channel coefficient therefore requires that we generate (1/2) log2 Q bits from
√
each of the real and imaginary parts, which means that each part is quantized using q = Q
levels. The algorithm further provides a mechanism for improving the probability of key
agreement. Let x represent the real part of a channel coefficient that satisfies a Gaussian dis60

tribution with known variance. Alice uses the cumulative distribution function (CDF) Fx (x)
of x to quantize its range of values into q equally-likely regions defined by the quantization
boundaries xi = Fx−1 (i/q) for i = 0, 1, . . . , q, where Fx−1 (·) is the inverse of Fx (·), and generates log2 q bits based on this quantization. Next, each of the q regions is divided into two
subregions with equal probability, and a quantization map (QM) bit is generated with value 0
or 1 indicating the subregion in which x lies. This QM bit is transmitted through the public
channel to Bob who determines his own quantization regions (or detection regions) based on
the QM bit, with the quantization boundaries x̄0 = x0 , x̄q = xq , and x̄i = Fx−1 ((4i ∓ 1)/4q)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , q − 1, where the upper and lower signs are for QM = 0 and 1 respectively.
Effectively, Bob adapts his decision region boundaries based on the additional information in
the QM bit, resulting in reduced susceptibility to channel coefficient errors (∆ha and ∆hb )
and therefore improved key agreement probability.
We could also explore key establishment using the quantization algorithm in [19]. A
comparison of this approach with the CQA scheme shows that while they differ in practical
implementation, they are virtually identical in terms of functional behavior and performance.
Therefore, without loss of generality, in this paper we only consider CQA.
4.5.2

Flexible Quantization Level
While this coefficient quantization algorithm was originally proposed for temporally

white MIMO channel samples, it can be used for spatially and temporally correlated channel
samples by applying it to each coefficient of the decorrelated channel vector obtained using the
procedure discussed in Section 4.4. However, we recall that the covariance of the decorrelated
vector is equal to the eigenvalues of the full covariance, which means that each element of the
decorrelated vector in general has a unique variance. Since the decorrelation using unitary
eigenvectors does not change the variance of the noise observed at each element (i.e. it
remains σn2 ), this effectively means that each channel vector entry has a unique SNR. Efficiently
quantizing the channel coefficients therefore requires that we consider this variable SNR in
setting quantization levels.
Establishing a method for implementing a flexible quantization level requires that we
understand the relationship between quantization and key agreement error. We therefore
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Figure 4.8: KER for i.i.d. complex Gaussian random variables using CQA with different
quantization levels and Lkey = 128 bits as well as the performance of the phase quantization
algorithm with Q = 21 .

study the KER, which represents the probability that one or more of the Lkey established key
bits are in error. Figure 4.8 plots the KER of CQA as a function of SNR for Lkey = 128 bits
and different quantization levels assuming that the channel coefficients are i.i.d. zero-mean
circularly-symmetric complex Gaussian random variables. The performance of the phase
quantization algorithm [14] with Q = 21 (half the bit generation efficiency of the coefficient
quantization curve for Q = 22 ) is also included for comparison. We emphasize that while
the poor KER of this phase quantization approach could be enhanced by implementation
of information exchange similar to that represented by the QM bit used in the coefficient
quantization, the algorithm bit generation efficiency of such a modified algorithm still does
not match that achieved by quantizing the full coefficient.
Suppose now that we set a KER to be achieved during the bit generation procedure.
Using results such as those shown in Fig. 4.8 allows us to determine the SNR threshold required
to ensure that the achieved KER remains below this maximum for each quantization level and
key length. Table 4.1 lists these SNR thresholds for several different quantization levels and
key lengths when KER = 10−3 , derived from i.i.d. circularly-symmetric complex Gaussian
random variables. Based on these numbers, we can choose the appropriate quantization level
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Table 4.1: SNR thresholds (in dB) to achieve KER = 10−3 (without coding).

Lkey
(bits)

64
128
256
512

22
23.5
24.3
24.5
25.0

Q
24
29.7
30.2
30.4
30.5

26
35.4
36.1
36.3
36.7

28
41.4
41.7
42.3
42.3

for each entry in the channel vector according to its SNR. For example, if Lkey = 128 bits and
24.3 dB ≤ SNR < 30.2 dB, Q = 22 is selected for this entry in the channel vector. However,

if SNR < 24.3 dB, this entry will not provide KER = 10−3 for any quantization level and
therefore is discarded in the key generation technique.
4.5.3

Eigenvector Transmission
The analysis reported in Fig. 4.8 includes the impact of channel estimate errors ∆ha and

∆hb . However, because this simulation begins with i.i.d. Gaussian random variables, it does
not explore the impact of these errors on the channel covariance estimate and the decorrelation
using this estimate. Since we are using a finite number of random variable realizations to form
the covariance that is subsequently used to decorrelate the channel coefficients, these errors
can potentially increase the achieved KER.
As we explore this issue, we assume that the true channel vector h in (5.1) and (5.2) is
composed of i.i.d. complex Gaussian random variables with unit variance. Although the true
channel covariance is the identity matrix, since Alice and Bob are observing and decorrelating
a finite set of noise-corrupted variables, their observed covariance matrix will not in general
be the identity matrix. Therefore, Alice and Bob respectively estimate the covariances Ra
and Rb from their channel estimates ha and hb , perform the necessary eigen-decomposition,
and construct the independent channel vector
ĥξ = U†ξ hξ ,
where Rξ = Uξ Λξ U†ξ and ξ ∈ {a, b}.
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Figure 4.9: KER-versus-SNR with or without the transmission of the eigenvector matrix.

Figure 4.9 plots the KER as a function of SNR with quantization level Q = 22 for a
2 × 2 system when Alice and Bob each decorrelate using their own estimates of the covariance
and assuming Lkey = 128 bits. As can be observed, the KER performance is very poor under
these circumstances. If, on the other hand, Alice estimates the covariance and transmits the
resulting eigenvectors to Bob for use in the decorrelation process, the performance can be
improved dramatically, as shown by the second curve in Fig. 4.9. Therefore, we assume that
Alice and Bob possess the same eigenvector matrix for the remainder of this discussion.
We note that transmission of the eigenvector matrix over the public channel reveals
information regarding the distribution of the random channel vector to Eve, particularly if
Eve also deduces the eigenvalues of the covariance. If the quantization boundaries used for key
establishment were, for example, chosen to be uniformly-spaced over a specified range, this
information would reveal to Eve the most probable values of the established bits. However,
because we instead quantize the observed channel realizations into uniformly-likely regions,
the established bits take all possible values with equal probability. Therefore, revealing information about the distribution of the underlying random variable does not reveal information
about the realized bits, and therefore the security of the protocol is maintained.
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4.5.4

Key Generation Protocol with Coding
The SNR thresholds obtained in Section 4.5.2 tend to be relatively high. Motivated by

this observation, we investigate the application of channel coding in the key generation process,
such as the coset assignment method [11] or LDPC coding [16], to reduce the required SNR
levels. While either method is likely suitable, because of the favorable performance previously
demonstrated using LDPC codes, we focus on this method in our analysis. The protocol for
key establishment consists of the following steps:
Decorrelation: Alice estimates the full covariance from her estimates of the channel vector ha
and decorrelates ha using the eigenvectors Ua .
Generation: Alice generates the key (or binary sequence) using the coefficient quantization
algorithm with flexible quantization levels determined by the specific SNR for each element
of the channel vector. She also determines the QM bits as discussed in Section 4.5.1 and
forms the syndromes of the binary sequence by multiplying the binary sequence with the
parity-check matrix of the LDPC codes [16].
Transmission: The eigenvectors, quantization levels, QM bits, and syndromes of the binary
bits are transmitted through the public insecure but authenticated channel from Alice to Bob.
Detection: Bob performs the decorrelation process with the received eigenvectors and, based
on the quantization regions determined by the QM bits and quantization levels, he generates
his own binary sequence using the coefficient quantization algorithm. An estimate of Alice’s
binary sequence is obtained with the help of the syndromes and his binary sequence that is
highly correlated with that of Alice.
Privacy Amplification: The privacy amplification process [10] is performed on the binary
sequence (or the estimate of the binary sequence) with a universal class of Hash functions [59]
respectively by Alice or Bob, producing the final secret key.
While the performance of this protocol could likely be improved through the implementation of soft decisions in the detection of the binary sequence using LDPC codes, this
remains an unsolved problem for the coefficient quantization algorithm introduced in [18].
Therefore, our detection uses a hard decision, and the decoder uses the message-passing algorithm introduced in [60]. Furthermore, because key agreement can be verified using a simple
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post-establishment exchange and because keys between nodes are generated infrequently, key
agreement probabilities can be larger than what is typically deemed acceptable for bit error
rates in communications. As a result, we focus on a KER of 10−3 , meaning that the key
establishment protocol only fails once in 1000 applications.
Privacy amplification is applied in this protocol to distill a key offering perfect secrecy,
because the public transmission of the syndromes for information reconciliation reveals information about the key to Eve. Assume that the bit sequence S before privacy amplification
has length LS and that Ŝ = G(S) of length LŜ is the secret key Alice and Bob select, where
G is chosen randomly from a universal class of hash functions from {0, 1}LS to {0, 1}LŜ [59].
Furthermore, let V = e(S) of length LV represent the sequence obtained by Eve for the arbitrary eavesdropping function e: {0, 1}LS → {0, 1}LV for some LV < LS . According to [10,
Corollary 5], the average information about the secret key Ŝ given G and V satisfies
I(Ŝ; G, V ) ≤ 2−s /ln2,

(4.22)

where s is a positive safety parameter and s = LS − LŜ − LV . As long as s is sufficiently large,
I(Ŝ; G, V ) ≃ 0.
4.6

Performance Simulations
Having completed our detailed analysis of the issues associated with key establishment

from correlated MIMO channel samples, we are now ready to explore the performance of
our protocol using simulations. These simulations rely on the measured channel responses
discussed in Section 4.4. Although the channel samples obtained from the measurement are
8 × 8 matrices, we extract a Nr × Nt subset of each matrix in the simulation. Also, because
these measurements are densely sampled in time, we first downsample the data to achieve the
desired sample rate. To achieve our desired interval d between subsequent samples, we must
take every pth sample from the measured data. Our resulting data vector consisting of K
samples is formed as
h
iT
(f )
(f )T
(f )T
(f )T
(f )T
ḣk = hk
hk+p hk+2p . . . hk+(K−1)p .
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(4.23)

Table 4.2: SNR thresholds (in dB) to achieve KER = 10−3 (with LDPC coding).

Lkey
(bits)

64
128
256
512

22
12.3
12.9
13.4
13.6

Q
24
18.7
18.8
19.1
19.3

26
24.1
24.5
24.6
24.9

28
29.9
29.9
29.9
30.4

We can now form the covariance by averaging over frequency bins (f ) and start times (k).
This computation assumes the form

R=

K0 −1 X
F
1 X
(f ) (f )†
ḣk ḣk ,
F K0 k=0 f =1

(4.24)

where we use F = 80 as the total number of available frequency bins and K0 = 10.
A rate 1/2 LDPC code of length Lℓ = 816 with the parity-check matrix available
in [61] is used for error correction, and the message-passing decoding algorithm [60] with
Nℓ = 100 decoding iterations is applied in the LDPC decoder. Because of the effectiveness of
LDPC coding in reducing the key disagreement, the SNR thresholds required for the various
quantization levels Q and key length Lkey with KER = 10−3 are reduced, as listed in Table 4.2
deriving from i.i.d. circularly-symmetric complex Gaussian random variables, although this
requires hashing out half of the generated bits in the privacy amplification process.
4.6.1

Fixed K, Variable SNR
To evaluate the performance of the key generation protocol, we first consider the num-

ber of key bits generated per channel as a function of SNR for a fixed number of channel
samples. Without loss of generality, we assume K = 1. Figure 4.10 illustrates the performance of CQA without modification, with flexible quantization boundaries but no LDPC
coding, and with both flexible quantization boundaries and LDPC coding for a 2 × 2 MIMO

system with KER = 10−3 and Lkey = 128. The performance bound computed from (4.14) is
also included for comparison. These results show that although the unmodified CQA achieves
a slope of key generation rate with SNR that matches that of the bound, it requires a very high
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Figure 4.10: Key length per channel as a function of SNR using different key generation
algorithms for a 2 × 2 system, K = 1, KER = 10−3 , Lkey = 128.

SNR (greater than 30 dB) to achieve KER = 10−3 . Adding flexible quantization levels lowers
this SNR requirement without impacting the slope. Further addition of LDPC coding further
reduces the SNR requirements at low SNR. However, as the SNR increases, the coding gain
is no longer necessary and coding therefore only penalizes the key establishment efficiency,
suggesting that LDPC coding should be dropped for practical implementation in high SNR
scenarios.
Figure 4.11 plots the key length per channel as a function of SNR using the protocol
with LDPC coding and the same parameters for different antenna array dimensions. This
result demonstrates that with larger antenna arrays, or equivalently more random variables
for a fixed K, more bits are generated per channel and the generation efficiency is improved.
4.6.2

Fixed SNR, Variable K
The top plot in Fig. 4.12 shows the number of bits per temporal channel sample as a

function of K achieved with this protocol assuming that SNR = 20 dB when LDPC coding is
applied for a 2 × 2 system. The simulation assumes that samples are added (K is increased)
with a fixed sample interval d = Lc /9, as illustrated in Fig. 4.5(b), and therefore the behavior
is similar to that observed in Fig. 4.7. The performance bound obtained using the estimated
68

Key Length (bits per channel)

35
30

2×2
3×3
4×4

25
20
15
10
5
0
0

5

10

15
SNR (dB)

20

25

30

Figure 4.11: Key length per channel as a function of SNR using the key generation protocol
with LDPC coding for different antenna arrays, K = 1, KER = 10−3 , Lkey = 128.

covariance matrix is also shown for comparison. Clearly, the basic performance trend of the
algorithm is similar to that of the bound, although there is a considerable performance gap
between the two.
The bottom plot in Fig. 4.12 demonstrates the total distance over which samples must
be taken to achieve a key of length Lkey = 128 bits, as discussed in Section 4.3.3. Once again,
we can identify an optimal value of K that minimizes this sampling distance. Also, given the
reduced efficiency of the algorithm compared to that of the bound observed in the top plot
of this figure, it is not surprising that the distance required to achieve the desired key length
with the algorithm is higher than that obtained using the bound.
Figure 4.13 plots the minimum distance required to achieve a 128-bit key with d =
Lc /9, SNR = 20 dB for different antenna arrays, demonstrating the benefits of using multiple
antennas to reduce the required receiver displacement for key establishment. These results
show that for both the algorithm and the bound, most of the gains associated with additional
antennas are realized with a simple 2 × 2 system.
Figures 4.10, 4.12, and 4.13 reveal that while the protocol used here is effective in
realizing encryption keys, its performance falls short of that predicted by the bound. We
first emphasize that the key focus of this paper is the exploration of using correlated samples
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10−3 and SNR = 20 dB for a 2 × 2 system. Top: Bits per temporal sample as a function of the
number of samples when the samples are obtained with fixed sample intervals. Bottom: The
distance required to achieve 128 bits with different numbers of samples within a segment.

in the key-establishment process, and therefore we use existing algorithms to perform this
evaluation. Still, future work should focus on improving quantization algorithms and possibly
coupling them with different coding methods that improve the KER for a given SNR. As an
example, we have investigated a generalization of CQA in which the nodes subdivide each
quantization region into a larger number of subdivisions, with Alice sending additional QM
bits to Bob. This allows increased flexibility in Bob’s selection of quantization boundaries and
therefore enhances key agreement. A detailed analysis of the impact of this enhancement is
too lengthy to include in this chapter and detracts from the primary focus, and therefore this
will be the subject of Chapter 5. Certainly, other methods for increasing key establishment
efficiency should be possible and hopefully will emerge through additional research activities.
4.7

Chapter Summary
After the brief introduction of physical layer security, this chapter investigates the es-

tablishment of secret encryption keys from temporally and spatially correlated MIMO channel
matrices. The discussion first examines the influence of correlation on the secret key rate, or
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Figure 4.13: The minimum distance required to achieve 128 bits for different numbers of
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equivalently the bound on the achievable key length, with the help of a simple SISO channel
model that generates samples with correlation behavior that can be described in closed-form.
This analysis reveals that an optimal sampling approach can be devised that minimizes the
total time (or distance) required to achieve a key with a specified length. The presentation also examines the decorrelation of measured channel samples, and demonstrates that
independently removing spatial and temporal correlations fails to produce random variables
that are truly decorrelated. Finally, attention turns to a method for quantizing the uncorrelated channel samples using flexible quantization levels and error correction using LDPC
codes to enhance key agreement over an authenticated public channel. Simulations using real
channel measurements reconfirm the observations made using the simple channel model and
demonstrate that while existing algorithms for channel quantization can be effective, their
performance falls significantly short of the performance bound.
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Chapter 5
Improved Channel Quantization Techniques for Secret Key Establishment
The prior chapter demonstrates how to use channel quantization in a protocol for
secret key establishment, and it motivates the need to develop improved methods whose key
establishment efficiency is closer to that predicted by the upper bound. In this chapter, we
focus attention on such an implementation by generalizing the algorithms introduced in [18,
19]. Specifically, we demonstrate that both algorithms function by allowing one node to adapt
its quantization boundaries in response to information supplied by the other, and we use this
understanding to generalize the algorithms to enhance the flexibility of this boundary shift.
We demonstrate that the symbol error rate (SER) quantifying the KER performance of the
enhanced algorithms is much lower than that of the original schemes and that it approaches
the theoretical performance bound. Further simulations reveal that the algorithms offer good
bit generation efficiency, particularly for high SNR. While the bulk of the discussion focuses
on channel coefficients representing independent samples obtained from SISO systems, we
also demonstrate increased key generation efficiency through application of the techniques to
correlated samples obtained from MIMO channels.
5.1
5.1.1

Key Establishment Principles
System Model
We consider the scenario where two legitimate nodes Alice and Bob wish to establish a

secure communication link in the presence of an unknown eavesdropper Eve. In establishing

73

the link, Alice and Bob each probe the common SISO channel, producing the estimates
ha = h + ∆ha ,

(5.1)

hb = h + ∆hb ,

(5.2)

respectively, where the true channel h and channel estimation errors ∆ha and ∆hb all represent
independent symmetric complex zero-mean Gaussian random variables with variances σ 2 (for
h) and ση2 (for ∆ha and ∆hb ). We assume that Eve can estimate her channel to Alice or
Bob but that her channel estimates are independent of h, an assumption that is typically
valid when Eve is sufficiently far from Alice and Bob (i.e. several wavelengths in a multipath
environment).
We pause here to emphasize that Eve is a passive attacker who eavesdrops on the
legitimate communication. If Eve is instead an active attacker who tries to modify or insert
fraudulent messages into the legitimate exchange, Alice and Bob must create a secure common
channel to protect data integrity. This can be accomplished using an authentication procedure
using a Hash function or a message authentication code (MAC) [5] if Alice and Bob pre-share
an initial key before any public discussion [53]. If, on the other hand, Eve masquerades as Alice
or Bob during channel probing, the system must detect this masquerade using a hypothesis
testing approach as detailed in [62].
5.1.2

Channel Quantization
If the channel estimation errors ∆ha and ∆hb are small, Alice and Bob can each

quantize their channel estimates to generate bits that are likely the same. For example,
let the random variables xa and xb represent the information possessed by Alice and Bob
respectively, which might denote the phase [14] or the real or imaginary part [11, 16] of the
channel coefficient. Since the estimation errors at both nodes satisfy the same distribution,
xa and xb satisfy the same CDF, denoted as Fx (x). Based on knowledge (or estimates) of this
CDF, Alice and Bob divide the identical domain of these variables into Q identical regions of
equal probability, leading to the quantization boundaries x̂0 , x̂1 , . . . , x̂Q , where Fx (x̂i ) = i/Q
with i = 0, 1, . . . , Q. The quantization produces log2 Q bits for each realization of the random
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Figure 5.1: Illustration of the quantization regions using the traditional quantization method
with Q = 4.

variables xa and xb . Figure 5.1 illustrates the quantization regions applied in such a scheme
with Q = 4.
While this approach is intuitive and simple, when either xa or xb is close to a quantization boundary, there is increased probability that the bits generated by Alice and Bob will
differ as a result of channel estimation errors. The channel quantization alternating (CQA)
scheme [18], in which x represents the real or imaginary part of the channel coefficient, takes
measures to reduce this error. In this protocol, Alice quantizes xa as outlined above using the
quantization boundaries x̂0 , x̂1 , . . . , x̂Q and divides each of the quantization regions into two
subregions of equal probability. Alice then establishes a quantization mapping (QM) value that
is set to 0 or 1 if xa falls within the first or second subregion, respectively, and transmits QM
to Bob. Bob forms the quantization boundaries x̄0 = x̂0 , x̄Q = x̂Q , and x̄i = Fx−1 ((i+ ξQM )/Q)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , Q − 1, where ξQM = (2 ∗ QM − 1)/4 and Fx−1 (·) denotes the inverse of Fx (·).
Effectively, Bob dynamically moves his quantization boundaries a distance of ξ0 = −1/4Q or
ξ1 = 1/4Q, which increases the likelihood that the resulting key bits will agree with those
generated by Alice. Figure 5.2 shows the quantization regions of the CQA scheme with Q = 4
regions and the values of QM.
The multi-bit adaptive quantization (MAQ) scheme [19] represents a second method
for improving the KER of the generated keys. In this method, Alice and Bob quantize xa and
xb into Q0 = 4Q quantization levels, with each quantization region indexed by the integer ka
for Alice and kb for Bob and 1 ≤ ka , kb ≤ Q0 . Alice computes the value R = ⌊mod(ka , 4)/2⌋,
where mod(·, P ) denotes modulo P and ⌊·⌋ denotes the integer floor function, and sends R to
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Figure 5.2: Illustration of the quantization regions of the CQA scheme with Q = 4 for QM =
0, 1.

Bob. Alice and Bob then respectively compute the integers fR (ka ) and fR (kb ), where

fR (k) =



 ⌊mod(k + 1, Q0 )/4⌋ R = 0

 ⌊(k − 1)/4⌋

,

(5.3)

R=1

so that 0 ≤ fR (k) < Q. Alice and Bob each use this integer as an index to select one of Q
Gray codewords each consisting of log2 Q bits. Figure 5.3 illustrates this scheme for Q = 4
and for the case of R = 0, 1.
To illustrate the performance gain obtainable with the CQA and MAQ algorithms,
consider a simulation where we generate channel coefficients and channel estimation errors
in (5.1) and (5.2) as i.i.d. symmetric complex Gaussian random variables with variance
σ 2 and ση2 respectively. The quantization procedure is applied separately to the real and
imaginary parts of the complex coefficient, so that we obtain two quantizations each producing
log2 Q bits per complex channel realization. A symbol error is recorded if Alice and Bob
experience disagreement in one or more of the bits generated from a quantization, with the
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Figure 5.3: Illustration of the quantization regions of the MAQ scheme with Q = 4 for R = 0, 1.

SER representing the probability of such a symbol error estimated from 107 complex channel
coefficient realizations. The SNR measures the size of the channel estimation errors relative
to that of the true channel coefficients, or SNR = σ 2 /ση2 , and the simulations use Q = 21 .
Figure 5.4 plots the SER performance of the CQA and MAQ schemes (curves for CQA(2)
and MAQ(2)) compared to that of traditional quantization. This result demonstrates that
CQA and MAQ both outperform the traditional quantization methods, particularly for high
SNR, due to their use of dynamic detection boundaries. Because the two algorithms offer an
equivalent boundary shift, it is intuitive that they achieve virtually the same performance.
We note that although the specific channel quantization and bit generation details in
CQA and MAQ are different, these two algorithms share some fundamental similarities:
1. Alice’s quantization level Q0 is greater than Q, where Q is the minimal quantization level
required to generate log2 Q bits per quantization, with Q0 = 2Q in CQA and Q0 = 4Q
in MAQ respectively.
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2. Some necessarily auxiliary information, either the QM in CQA or R information in
MAQ, is transmitted through the public channel.
3. Depending on the auxiliary information received, Bob selects one of the two detection
regions to generate the key.
4. The effectiveness of these two algorithms in reducing key disagreement is achieved because equivalently Bob dynamically selects the detection quantization boundaries, which
allows larger noise perturbation especially for the realizations close to the quantization
boundaries.
5.2

Algorithm Generalization and Performance Analysis
The native implementations of the CQA and MAQ schemes offer improved key agree-

ment performance as a result of information transmitted from Alice that allows Bob to shift
the boundaries of his quantization regions. It is intuitive that this principle can be generalized to allow additional flexibility in this dynamic boundary definition, and therefore improved
key agreement performance. This section provides such generalizations and uses closed-form
analysis to quantify the achievable performance gains.
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5.2.1

Generalized CQA Scheme
Generalization of the CQA scheme involves subdividing each quantization region into

an arbitrary number of equally-probable subregions. This generalized procedure consists of
the following algorithmic steps:
1. Alice and Bob agree on a set of Gray codewords, each consisting of log2 Q bits and
associated with a unique quantization region. They also agree on the value of NC ≥ 1.
2. Alice quantizes xa using Q equally probable levels with quantization boundaries x̂i =
Fx−1 (i/Q), i = 0, 1, . . . , Q. The ith Gray code is selected if x̂i ≤ xa < x̂i+1 .
3. Alice subdivides each of the Q quantization regions into NC subregions, each with equal
probability and indexed using the set {0, 1, . . . , NC − 1}. The value of QM sent to Bob
is the index of the subregion containing the measurement xa .
4. Bob forms quantization boundaries x̄0 = Fx−1 (0), x̄Q = Fx−1 (1), and x̄i = Fx−1 ((i +
ξQM )/Q) for i = 1, 2, . . . , Q − 1, where ξQM = (2 ∗ QM − (NC − 1))/2NC . The ith Gray
code is selected if x̄i ≤ xb < x̄i+1 .
We refer to this generalized scheme as CQA(NC ), so that the originally proposed algorithm
corresponds to CQA(2). The expression for x̄i explicitly reveals that Bob’s boundaries shift
(in probability) by ξQM /Q.
5.2.2

Generalized MAQ Scheme
The generalized MAQ scheme for a larger number of quantization subregions consists

of the following algorithmic steps:
1. Alice and Bob agree on a set of Gray codewords, each consisting of log2 Q bits and
associated with a unique quantization region. They also agree on the value of MM = 2NM
where NM ≥ 2.
2. Alice and Bob respectively quantize xa and xb with Q0 = MM Q equally-probable regions
and identify ka such that x̂ka −1 ≤ xa ≤ x̂ka and kb such that x̂kb −1 ≤ xb ≤ x̂kb , where
ka , kb = 1, 2, . . . , Q0 and x̂k = Fx−1 (k/Q0 ).
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3. Alice computes R = ⌊mod(ka , MM )/2⌋ such that R = 0, 1, . . . , NM − 1 and transmits R
to Bob.
4. Alice and Bob respectively compute fR (ka ) and fR (kb ), where
f0 (k) = f¯0 (k),



0
1 ≤ k ≤ 2R


fR (k)|R>0 =
f¯R (k) 2R < k ≤ K0 ,



 Q−1 K < k ≤Q
0
0

(5.4)

(5.5)

with f¯R (k) = ⌊mod(k + NM − 1 − 2R, Q0 )/MM ⌋ and K0 = Q0 − 3NM + 2R.
5. Alice and Bob respectively select the Gray codeword with index fR (ka ) and fR (kb ).
We designate this scheme as MAQ(NM ) so that the originally proposed algorithm corresponds
to MAQ(2). Analysis of the boundary shift shows that it is the same as that for CQA(NC ).
5.2.3

Boundary Margin
Given these generalized algorithms, we wish to formally quantify the impact of the

boundary shifts. One way to accomplish this goal is to explore the distance between Alice’s
observed value and the closest detection boundary established by Bob based on the information
supplied by Alice. To analyze this distance, let xa = x0 represent Alice’s specific value to
be quantized. The detection region for Bob that allows fkey (xb ) = fkey (x0 ), where fkey (·)
represents the key generation function, can be expressed as x0 − ∆x1 ≤ xb ≤ x0 + ∆x2 ,
where ∆x1 and ∆x2 are real and non-negative. The boundary margin of x0 is defined as the
probabilistic distance between x0 and Bob’s closest quantization boundary, or
BM(x0 ) = min {Fx (x0 + ∆x2 ) − Fx (x0 ), Fx (x0 ) − Fx (x0 − ∆x1 )} .

(5.6)

Figure 5.5 illustrates this notion for CQA(5), where the point x0 lies within the ith quantization region and second subregion. In this case, after Bob shifts the boundaries, the second
term in the min{·} function of (5.6) is smallest and represents BM(x0 ).
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Because Fx (·) is a nondecreasing monotonic function, a larger value of BM(x0 ) implies
a larger value of ∆x1 and/or ∆x2 , indicating an increased probability of key agreement.
However, with reference to Fig. 5.5, it is clear that if x0 moves closer to the left boundary
of its subregion, BM(x0 ) will decrease (if x0 lies in a different subregion, this decrease in
BM(x0 ) may occur for x0 shifting to the right). The key agreement performance depends on
the minimum value of BM(x0 ) for all x0 in the same subregion, denoted as
BMmin = minx0 {BM(x0 )} .

(5.7)

In Fig. 5.5, the probability extent of each quantization region is 1/Q, and therefore
that of each subregion is 1/NC Q. It is therefore straightforward to see from Fig. 5.5 that
for CQA(5), BMmin = 2/NC Q. More generally for CQA(NC ), BMmin = (NC − 1)/2NC Q,
revealing that as NC → ∞ we obtain BMmin = 1/2Q. This result is intuitive, because if Alice
communicates enough information, Bob can always ensure that x0 lies in the middle of his
detection region. Since the definition in (5.6) ensures that the boundary margin is always
non-negative, we have 0 ≤ BMmin < 1/2Q.
Analysis also reveals that the boundary margin for MAQ(NM ) is BMmin = (NM −
1)/2NM Q, indicating that CQA(NC ) and MAQ(NM ) should have similar key agreement performance if NC = NM . We also recognize that the original CQA and MAQ algorithms have
BMmin = 1/4Q, demonstrating the performance benefit offered by the generalized algorithms.
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5.2.4

Error Analysis
When the SNR is high, the channel estimation error is small, implying that key dis-

agreement occurs mainly for estimates that lie near the quantization boundaries. In this case,
implementing an algorithm that increases BMmin is an effective approach for reducing key
mismatch. As the SNR is reduced below a certain threshold, however, shifting the quantization boundaries no longer has significant effect, suggesting the need for implementation of
information reconciliation with channel coding [11, 16]. The incorporation of channel coding
into CQA(NC ) and MAQ(NM ) can be performed using the protocol detailed in Section 4.5.4.
Our error analysis focuses on the case where no channel coding is used to allow emphasis on
the impact of the generalized key establishment algorithms.
We can compute the bound on the SER for CQA(NC ) in closed-form by letting NC →
∞, which also corresponds to the SER bound for MAQ(NM ) for NM → ∞. In this case,
Bob’s quantization region has lower and upper boundaries given by the functions x̄L (xa ) =
Fx−1 (Fx (xa ) − 1/2Q) and x̄U (xa ) = Fx−1 (Fx (xa ) + 1/2Q). If we manipulate (5.1) and (5.2) to
write xb = xa + ∆x, where ∆x is a zero-mean real Gaussian random variable with variance
ση2 , then the probability that Alice and Bob generate the same bits from the protocol is
Po (xa ) = P (x̄L (xa ) ≤ xb ≤ x̄U (xa ))
= P (x̄L (xa ) − xa ≤ ∆x ≤ x̄U (xa ) − xa )
= Fn (x̄U (xa ) − xa ) − Fn (x̄L (xa ) − xa ),

(5.8)

where Fn (·) is the CDF of ∆x. Based on our description of ha and hb in Section 5.1.1, xa and
xb are zero-mean real Gaussian random variables with variance σx2 = (σ 2 + ση2 )/2. Defining
SNR = σ 2 /ση2 , we express the SER of the algorithm for NC → ∞ averaged over all possible
values of xa as
PSER (SNR, Q) = 1 −

Z

∞
−∞

√

1
2
2
e−x /2σx Po (x)dx.
2πσx

(5.9)

Figure 5.6 plots the bound computed from (5.9) as a function of the SNR using numerical
approximation of the integrals and for four different values of the quantization level Q.
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Figure 5.6: SER performance bound of the algorithms for four different quantization levels Q.

Because the channel coefficients are i.i.d., the KER of keys with length L bits is easily
derived as
Pe (SNR, Q, L) = 1 − [1 − PSER (SNR, Q)]⌈L/ log2 Q⌉ ,

(5.10)

where ⌈·⌉ is the integer ceiling function.
5.2.5

Simulations
Figure 5.4, which was used in Section 5.1.2 to demonstrate the performance of the

original implementations of the algorithms, plots the SER performance of CQA(NC ) and
MAQ(NM ) as a function of SNR for different values of NC = NM = N using the simulation
method and parameters described in Section 5.1.2. These results reinforce the effectively
identical performance obtained from these two algorithms and further reveal that the SER
performance approaches that of the bound as N increases. Most notably, increasing from
N = 2 to N = 4 provides a relatively significant performance enhancement, motivating
the generalization and analysis provided here. The curves also reveal that the performance
gain obtained by increasing N is enhanced as the SNR increases. This verifies our earlier
reference to the concept that key disagreement for high SNR predominantly results from
channel coefficients lying near the quantization boundaries and emphasizes the important
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link between BMmin and key agreement performance. Of course, from an implementation
perspective, the most important performance measure is the KER performance based upon the
quantization of multiple sequential channel observations, which is plotted for this simulation
in Fig. 5.7 for a key of length L = 128 bits.
Figure 5.8 plots the SNR required to achieve SER = 10−6 for CQA(NC ) as a function
of NC , where the results of Fig. 5.4 make it clear that the curve for MAQ(NM ) would be
nearly identical to that shown. The plot reveals the dramatic improvement possible when
increasing NC from a value of 2 to a value of 8. As NC increases beyond this point, however,
the incremental improvement in BMmin and therefore the SER is small, as evidenced by the
reduced slope in the curve.
Figure 5.6 clearly demonstrates that the number of bits 2 log2 Q achieved per complex
channel realization can increase as the SNR increases. Figure 5.9 plots this number of secret
bits per channel realization for CQA(16) (or equivalently MAQ(16)) as a function of SNR
and under the constraint that SER ≤ 10−6 . We note that when SNR < 20.1 dB, this SER
constraint cannot be met for any quantization, which explains why the curve generated from
the simulations stops at this SNR. The plot also shows the secret key rate [6], which represents
the theoretical upper bound on key establishment performance. This comparison shows that
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the algorithm experiences a loss of approximately four bits relative to the performance specified
by the bound. However, the slope of the curve for the algorithm matches that for the bound,
suggesting that the algorithm is efficient for key establishment at high SNR.
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5.3

Correlated Channel Coefficients
The previous discussion has focused attention on the case where multiple channel

estimates used to construct a full key are uncorrelated and therefore independent. However, if
these channel estimates are obtained from multiple antennas or are taken as temporal samples
with the sample interval smaller than the channel coherence time, the resulting correlation
in the channel coefficients must be eliminated before quantization to avoid correlation in the
bits produced for the encryption key.
As a specific demonstration, consider a MIMO system with Nt transmit and Nr receive
antennas with the channel represented by the Nr ×Nt channel matrix H for the communication
link from the transmitter to the receiver and the Nt ×Nr channel matrix H̄ for the reverse link
T

from the receiver to the transmitter, with H = H̄ . We can represent these two matrices using

T
the Nr Nt × 1 vector h = vec{H} = vec{H̄ } and then compute the covariance R = E hh† .
If we compute the eigen-decomposition R = UΛU† , where Λ is the diagonal matrix of non-

negative real eigenvalues and U is the unitary matrix of eigenvectors, we can construct the
decorrelated channel vector from
ĥ = U† h.

(5.11)

Because the channel coefficients are jointly Gaussian, the elements of ĥ are independent, and
therefore a key can be generated by applying the algorithms in this paper to each element of ĥ
to extract a subset of the required bits. However, because each element of ĥ has a unique variance (given by the corresponding eigenvalue of R), each is quantized with its own quantization
level Q, similar to the discussion in Section 4.5.2. We note that this procedure could also be
used in the case where the correlated samples in h result from multiple temporally-correlated
observations of the channel.
We assume that Alice and Bob have the channel estimates
ha = h + ∆ha ,

(5.12)

hb = h + ∆hb ,

(5.13)
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where ∆ha and ∆hb are i.i.d. symmetric complex zero-mean channel estimation errors each
with variance ση2 . The SNR of the MIMO channel is defined as SNR = tr{R}/NrNt ση2 , where
tr{·} represents the matrix trace.
If we were to simulate the SER performance for this MIMO system, we would need to
apply the full decorrelation process detailed above. However, we focus here on the increased
key generation efficiency obtained by exploiting the multiple correlated channel coefficients,
and therefore we only need to determine the number of bits available from a single channel
vector. To obtain this number, we recognize that the SNR for the ℓth element of the decorrelated channel vector ĥa (or ĥb ) is SNRℓ = Λℓ /ση2 , ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , Nr Nt , where Λℓ is the ℓth
eigenvalue of the channel covariance R. The quantization level Q for each element is chosen
based on the results in Fig. 5.6 such that the bound (for infinite NC ) achieves SER ≤ 10−6
for that element. If SNRℓ < 20.1 dB, then the corresponding element of ĥa or ĥb is discarded
since it cannot achieve the SER constraint. We emphasize that we quantize the real and
imaginary parts of the channel separately, which leads to 2 log2 Q bits generated per complex
channel coefficient.
5.3.1

SVA model
We use a simple simulation to demonstrate the impact of using correlated samples on

the key generation process. In this computation, we model the propagation environment using
the SVA model [39], which stochastically represents the channel as multipaths clustered in time
and space, using the parameters given for the indoor channel in [39]. We assume linear dipole
arrays with half-wavelength element spacing at both nodes, and for each realization of the
multipath representation we compute the Nr Nt × 1 channel vector hm and for m = 1, 2, . . . M0
different random locations in the propagation environment. We then estimate the covariance
P 0
†
as R = (1/M0) M
m=1 hm hm .

Figure 5.10 illustrates the number of key bits generated per MIMO channel realization

as a function of SNR computed as an average over 500 random realizations of the SVA cluster
model for different numbers of antennas, and the covariance R of each random cluster realization is estimated with M0 = 20. These results demonstrate that larger array dimensions
increase the slope of the curve, indicating an increased key establishment efficiency, partic-
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array sizes and SER = 10−6 as well as that for the upper bound for a 3 × 3 system, simulated
with SVA model.

ularly for high SNR. Figure 5.10 also includes the upper bound on the key generation rate
for the 3 × 3 case. Once again, we observe that the slope of the curve representing the algorithm performance matches that representing the bound, reinforcing the efficiency of these
algorithms for high SNR. Similar observations result from comparisons to the bound for other
array dimensions.
5.3.2

Time-Varying Channel Model
The performance of the generalization of the channel quantization techniques is also

evaluated using the time-variant channel model introduced in Chapter 3. With the receiver
moving at a constant speed along a straight line, the channel covariance is estimated as
P
†
R = (1/W ) W
w=1 hw hw over a temporal window with W samples. Figures 5.11 and 5.12
illustrate the number of bits generated per channel realization as a function of SNR averaged
over 500 random realizations of time-variant channel with W = 20 and W = 100 respectively.
Both figures demonstrate larger array dimensions enable generation of longer keys. The results
further show that smooth curves are obtained only for a large window size W , since this
achieves a better covariance estimate. However, the performance of the algorithms and the
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bound depend on the estimation of the covariance, because SNRℓ and the bound are related
to the eigenvalues of the covariance. Recall that the bound achieves its maximum when the
eigenvalues are equal, as discussed in Section 4.3. Surprisingly, in both figures the slopes of the
curves are almost the same for different antenna array dimensions, with results different from
those observed in Fig. 5.10 which is related to the different distributions of the eigenvalues, or
equivalently the distributions of the SNR of each element in the channel vector. Figures 5.13,
5.14 and 5.15 plot the complementary CDF (CCDF) of the relative SNR, denoted as γℓ , with
SNR = 20 dB for the time-variant channel model with W = 20, 100 and the SVA model
respectively, where γℓ = SNRℓ − SNR, ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , Nr Nt . Relating these results to the
corresponding results in Figs. 5.10, 5.11, 5.12, we observe that the concentration of γℓ around
0 dB in Fig. 5.15 implies that more bits generated per channel realization of the SVA model.
This occurs because the eigenvalues of the covariance for the SVA model are distributed more
evenly than those of the time-variant MIMO model, indicating less correlation among the
channel realizations in the SVA model than those from the time-variant model. In other
words, the performance of the algorithms when applied in a MIMO system depends on the
channel characteristics, especially the covariance. Of course, the methods to estimate the
covariance are also very important, and techniques for obtaining good channel covariance
estimate for a particular environment remains an unsolved problem.
5.4

Chapter Summary
This chapter considers the establishment of secret encryption keys based on quantiza-

tion of the common communication channel between two nodes. Specifically, we analyze the
mechanisms for improving key agreement in two recently proposed quantization algorithms,
and demonstrate that both effectively allow shifting of the quantization boundaries at one of
the nodes based on information communicated from the other. This understanding allows us to
generalize these algorithms so that their KER performance can approach that of the theoretical bound. Simulations based on uncorrelated channel coefficients demonstrate that dramatic
performance enhancement in key agreement is possible through application of the generalized
algorithms. Simulations with correlated channel coefficients generated from MIMO system
models reveal a significant increase in key establishment rate enabled through quantization of
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Figure 5.11: Number of bits per Nr × Nt MIMO channel as a function of SNR for different
array sizes and SER = 10−6 as well as that for the upper bound for a 3 × 3 system, simulated
with the time-variant model and W = 20.

the multi-antenna channels. Specifically, in the simulation with the SVA model, performance
comparisons with the known bound on the secret key rate demonstrate that these generalized
algorithms achieve a slope in the key rate versus SNR that matches that of the bound, indicating that they are efficient key establishment protocols for high SNR. However, this promising
performance depends on the channel covariance, and can only be achieved when correlation
is low.

90

Key Length (bits per channel)

35
30

2×2
3×3
4×4

Bound: 3 × 3

25
20
15
10
5
0

20

25
SNR (dB)

30

Figure 5.12: Number of bits per Nr × Nt MIMO channel as a function of SNR for different
array sizes and SER = 10−6 as well as that for the upper bound for a 3 × 3 system, simulated
with the time-variant model and W = 100.
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Figure 5.13: Complementary CDF of the eigenvalues from the estimated channel covariance
with W = 20 for a 3 × 3 system.
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Figure 5.14: Complementary CDF of the eigenvalues from the estimated channel covariance
with W = 100 for a 3 × 3 system.
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Figure 5.15: Complementary CDF of the eigenvalues from the estimated SVA channel covariance for a 3 × 3 system.
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Chapter 6
Channel-Encryption Based Key Establishment Algorithms
We have shown that the spatial and temporal correlations in the MIMO channel coefficients can theoretically be removed through a whitening process based on their observed
space-time correlation, and the resulting uncorrelated random variables can each be used to
generate a portion of the key using methods developed for SISO communications, such as
the CQA or MAQ method introduced in Chapter 5. However, whitening requires computation of the full space-time covariance, which because of its potentially large size becomes
difficult to estimate and to use [28]. One option for avoiding this difficulty is to assume that
the covariance is separable in space and time, but simulations under this assumption reveal
that the time-variant channels whitened in this manner produce coefficients that cannot pass
statistical independence tests as detailed in Section 4.4. Therefore, in this chapter we consider establishing secret keys without first eliminating the channel correlation within MIMO
channel data.
In Section 6.1 we propose a key-generation protocol that builds on the technique detailed in [17] by (1) invoking a channel based encryption to protect the key from detection
by an eavesdropper and (2) enabling exploitation of the time-variant MIMO channel. Practical implementation of the protocol with the physical path-based time-variant channel model
detailed in Chapter 3 produces a plot of key length versus SNR whose slope almost matches
that of the bound at high SNR. One drawback of the algorithm is the public discussion between nodes during the key generation process that can potentially disclose information to the
eavesdropper. Therefore, degrees of freedom within the encryption process are optimized to
minimize the information revealed through implementation of a statistical test. Finally, we focus on practical techniques for information reconciliation between the nodes for improvement
of the BER performance associated with key agreement.
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The utilization of a statistical test eliminates correlation between the key information
and the information transmitted through the public channel. However, we are unable to prove
that this achieves independence because of the non-Gaussian distribution of the variables,
which means that the protocol can theoretically result in information disclosure. In order
to overcome this problem, we modify the algorithm by: (1) replacing channel multiplication
with channel addition and (2) sampling the channel temporally at an interval greater than
the channel coherence time. We denote the modified algorithm as channel-encryption with
addition. Although some information is still transmitted through the public discussion, the
amount of information disclosed can be estimated, and privacy amplification can be used to
distill a perfectly secret key.
To conclude the channel-encryption based algorithms, an algorithm combining channel
quantization and encryption is presented in Section 6.3. The quantized version of the channel
is used to encrypt the key information, and the ciphertext (the encrypted key information) is
transmitted through the public channel. Nevertheless, the publicly transmitted information
is encrypted with a one-time pad process, and therefore no information is disclosed to the
eavesdropper. Finally, we show that this algorithm has the same performance as the CQA
and MAQ algorithms introduced in Chapter 5, with the same boundary margin, SER bound
and probability of key disagreement bound.
6.1
6.1.1

Secret Key Generation with Channel Multiplication
System Model
Consider the case where two legitimate nodes Alice and Bob communicate wirelessly in

the vicinity of a malicious eavesdropper Eve. Through exchange of training sequences, Alice
and Bob respectively estimate their common channel transfer matrices at time sample k as
H(k)
= H(k) + ∆H(k)
a
a ,
(k)

Hb

(k)T

= H̄

(k)

+ ∆Hb ,

(6.1)
(6.2)

where H(k) is the true Na × Nb channel at time sample k for the communication link from
(k)

Bob to Alice, and H̄

is the true Nb × Na channel for the reverse communication link from
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(k)T

Alice to Bob with H(k) = H̄

, Na and Nb are the numbers of antennas Alice and Bob have

respectively, k = 0, 1, . . . , K − 1, and we assume N1 = Na = Nb . The matrices ∆H(k)
and
a
(k)

∆Hb represent the channel estimation errors and are here modeled as independent random
variables satisfying a zero-mean complex Gaussian distribution with variance ση2 . Eve similarly
(k)

estimates her own channels H(k)
ea and Heb from Alice and Bob respectively. Provided Eve is
adequately separated from Alice and Bob, it is reasonable to assume that H(k) and therefore
(k)

(k)

(k)
H(k)
a and Hb are independent of Hea and Heb . Because of this independence, the protocol

used to establish the key will not require application of advantage distillation [10].
6.1.2

Key Establishment Using Channel Multiplication
Our proposed approach is based on the technique given in [17], where a random variable

x is transmitted to Bob over a SISO (scalar) channel so that yb = hba x+nb and ye = hea x+ne ,
where hba and hea are the channels from Alice to Bob and Eve, respectively, and nb and ne
are noise modeled as zero-mean complex Gaussian variables. This random variable x is used
by both Alice and Bob to generate the secret key but cannot be detected by Eve if she has
no knowledge of hea or a low detection SNR. Of course, in practical situations where Alice
and Bob may exchange training data so that each may estimate their common channel, it is
unreasonable to assume that Eve cannot learn her own channel, and therefore it is difficult to
use this principle for practical secret key establishment unless it can be assumed that Eve’s
detection SNR remains low.
To begin our development, we assume that Alice has generated an encryption key by
means of a suitable algorithm and wishes to transmit this key to Bob over the MIMO channel
(k)

(k)

(k)

by means of an N1 × NE matrix E(k) with mnth element Emn = Amn ejθmn , where NE is
determined by several factors as discussed in Section 6.1.4. Because this public transmission
can potentially disclose information about the key to Eve, we wish to form E(k) such that
we can minimize the information disclosed. This suggests that we should not use all degrees
of freedom available in E(k) to represent the key, and we therefore use the phase values
(k)

as the key representation. Specifically, we let θmn be a discrete value drawn from the set
{0, 2π/Q, . . . , 2(Q − 1)π/Q}, where Q is the quantization level, which means that each value
(k)

of θmn represents log2 Q bits of the key for a total key of length N1 NE log2 Q. If the key has
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been properly generated, the resulting phase values appear as independent discrete random
variables uniformly distributed on the set.
To avoid disclosure of the key to Eve, Alice must encrypt the matrix E(k) before
transmission using information common to Alice and Bob but unknown to Eve. Alice therefore
(k)
constructs and transmits the matrix U(k) = H(k)
a E , allowing Bob to compute

Ê

(k)

(k) −1

= Hb

(k) −1

U(k) = Hb

(k)
H(k)
a E .

(6.3)

(k)

Bob then estimates the phases of Ê , allowing reconstruction of the key. Without channel


(k)
estimation errors Hb = H(k)
, Bob can perfectly reconstruct the key, while Eve cannot
a
(k)

because of her lack of knowledge of H(k)
a or Hb . We will discuss performance implications of
channel estimation errors and noise and provide practical methods for improving performance
under such circumstances in Section 6.1.5. We also emphasize that we have not yet specified
(k)

the amplitude matrix A(k) with the mnth element Amn , which gives us flexibility in the
encryption process.
6.1.3

Statistical Test
One vulnerability created by the public discussion of U(k) between Alice and Bob is

that it potentially allows Eve to obtain information about H(k) and Θ(k) (the key), Θ(k) =
[θ11 θ21 . . . θN1 1 . . . θN1 NE ]T , and clearly this means that Alice should minimize the disclosed
information. In this section, we demonstrate how Alice can specify A(k) to reduce the revealed
information through application of a statistical test.
We first consider the correlation between the N12 × 1 = r × 1 vector x and the N1 NE ×

(k)
1 = s × 1 vector u, where x = vec{H(k)
a }, u = vec{U }. We form the four possible

covariance matrices Rxx , Rxu , Rux , and Ruu by approximating the required expectations

(i.e. Rxx = E xx† ) using a sample mean over the K time samples, and we then form the
composite covariance



Rc = 

Rxx Rxu
Rux Ruu
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.

(6.4)

The hypothesis of decorrelation of the two vectors x and u is
H0 : Rxu = 0.
To test this hypothesis, we find the Wilks’ likelihood ratio test statistic for H0 : Rxu = 0 [58]
as
Λ=

|Rc |
,
|Rxx ||Ruu|

(6.5)

which is distributed as Λr,s,K−1−s. Then, given a critical value Λα determined from statistical
tables [63] with the significance level α , we accept H0 that x and u are independent if Λ > Λα .
Since tables for this distribution can be limited in the values they offer, we choose to use the
fact that the transformed value


r+s+1
χ =− K −1−
2
2



lnΛ,

(6.6)

satisfies the χ2 -distribution with f = rs degrees of freedom [63], where N0 = K − 1 − s
represents the degrees of freedom of the error. We then reject H0 if χ2 > χ2α with significance

level α. This procedure can obviously be applied to similarly test the decorrelation of Θ(k)
and u(k) .
This decorrelation test can be used to determine the value of A(k) (the magnitude
of the elements of E(k) ) that provides desirable properties in U(k) . To this end, we realize
(k)

independent random values Amn from the Rayleigh distribution with variance σA2 , and for each
realization we test whether or not the resulting value of U(k) is uncorrelated with both H(k)
a
and Θ(k) . If the realization fails the decorrelation test, we continue to generate realizations
of A(k) until the tests are passed. This allows us to assume that u is uncorrelated to x and
Θ(k) , which means that U(k) is uncorrelated with the channel and key information. We also
note that when the elements of A(k) satisfy the Rayleigh distribution, the elements of E(k)
satisfy the joint Gaussian distribution when Q → ∞, which means E(k) has the maximum
differential entropy for a given covariance [64].
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6.1.4

Impact of Correlation
When applying this algorithm to real channels, we must consider the impact of spatial

and temporal correlation in the MIMO channel coefficients. Strictly speaking, because a single
channel realization is used to encrypt NE complex vectors of length N1 (the NE columns
of E(k) ), spatial correlation in the channel matrix may make it easier for Eve to guess the
encryption matrix H(k)
over time. However, provided that NE is relatively small, meaning
a
that only a portion of the key is encrypted with a single channel matrix, the risk of detection
will be very small. More importantly, however, spatial correlation can lead to an ill-conditioned
channel matrix which will pose problems when Bob attempts to estimate E(k) using (6.3) if
(k)

there is any error in the detected value of U(k) or estimated value of Hb , as will exist in
a practical system. Use of least-square estimation detailed in Section 6.1.5 can reduce the
probability of error if the spatial correlation is not severe. Other techniques which can help in
this scenario include the regularization of the channel matrix or the reduction in the number
of bits allocated to each vector in E(k) . Detailed analysis of this effect and methods for
overcoming it is outside the scope of the current treatment, and this work will assume that
the receiver is able to obtain an error-free value of U(k) .
The algorithm as presented only uses a single sample of the channel matrix sequence for
encoding of the key, and theoretically this single matrix can be used to encrypt an entire key,
implying that NE is chosen so that N1 NE log2 Q equals the desired key length. Naturally, over
time, Eve will be able to guess the encryption matrix H(k)
a if it is used to send large amounts
of data (large number of key bits) over the channel, and therefore we can consider the use of Γ
channel samples, each used for encryption of a fraction of the bits in the key, which means that
NE is chosen so that the key length is ΓN1 NE log2 Q. If the channel snapshots are temporally
correlated, however, it is theoretically easier for Eve to guess each subsequent sample. If the
key is long enough that this becomes a concern, naturally the process can simply make sure
that the channel sample interval is larger than the channel coherence time.
These observations lead to a simple yet important conclusion. For the algorithm presented in this paper, temporal and spatial correlations may create performance degradation
and require implementation considerations. However, they will not create correlation in the
bits forming the established key.
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6.1.5

Reducing Key Mismatch
(k)

Because of errors in the channel estimates H(k)
and Hb , Bob’s estimate of the key
a
will experience a certain bit error rate. This section discusses several methods that can be
applied to increase the reliability of this communication.
Gray Coding
One simple method for reducing the BER of the key transmission is to encode bits
using Gray codes rather than natural binary codes when constructing the phase matrix Θ(k) .
This represents a straightforward implementation of a well-established approach for BER
reduction.
Least-Square Estimation
(k)

(k)

Consider the case where Alice has two channel sequences Ha1 and Ha2 , k = 0, . . . , K −
(k)

(k)

1, with Bob having the corresponding sequences Hb1 and Hb2 . At each time sample, Alice
forms


(k)

(k)



(k)
U1
(k)
U2





=

(k)
Ha1
(k)
Ha2



 E(k) ,

and transmits U1 and U2 to Bob. Bob then estimates Ê

Ê

(k)

(6.7)

(k)

using a pseudoinverse, or



−1


(k)
(k)
h
i
h
i
H
U
†
(k)†
(k)†
(k)†
 b1 
 1 .
=  H(k)
Hb1 Hb2
b1 Hb2
(k)
(k)
Hb2
U2

(6.8)

Application of this least-square method will reduce the probability of estimation error. Note,
(k)

however, that in this formulation it is assumed that U1

(k)

and U2

are error-free. If the

estimation of these matrices at the receiver has errors, Bob should instead employ the total
(k)

least-square method [65] to estimate Ê .
When applying this least-square estimation, we must decide on a method for forming
the two sequences from the channel estimates. Naturally, the algorithm performance is best
when the two sequences are independent. A more efficient use of the channel sequence, how(k)

(k)

(t)
ever, is to form the two sequences using Ha1 = H(k)
a and Ha2 = Ha for k = 0, 1, . . . , K − 1,

where t = (k + ⌈K/2⌉) with modulo K and ⌈·⌉ is the ceiling function. In this case, the
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statistical test discussed in Section 6.1.3 must be used to guarantee that the two correlated
(k)

(k)

(k)

(k)

channel sequences Ha1 and Ha2 are uncorrelated with U1 and U2 .
Channel Averaging
Under the assumption that the channel estimation error matrices for Alice and Bob are
composed of independent and identically distributed zero-mean Gaussian random variables,
we can reduce the estimation error by averaging the channels over a small window of W
(k)

(k)

samples. In this method, the average channel sequences Ha and Hb are computed using
(k)
Hγ

W −1
1 X (kw )
=
H
W w=0 γ

W −1
W −1
1 X
1 X (kw )
w)
=
H
+
∆H(k
,
γ
W w=0
W w=0

(6.9)

w)
where γ = {a, b}, kw = (k − w) with modulo K, and ∆H(k
is the channel estimation error
γ

at time kw .
(k)

(k)

Equation (6.9) clearly shows that Ha and Hb each have a different value of the
P −1
(kw )
average error term ∆H = (1/W ) W
. As W → ∞, ∆H → 0, which means that if
w=0 ∆Hγ

these average quantities are used in encryption and detection of E(k) in (6.3), bit errors due
to differences in the channel estimates used by Alice and Bob will be eliminated. However,

because the channel matrix coefficients themselves are zero-mean variables over long time
(k)

intervals, making W too large will cause Hγ

→ 0. Therefore, the window size W must

be chosen to effectively reduce the error while maintaining a channel matrix characterized
by a reasonable variance across the elements. The performance as a function of window
size is demonstrated in the computational results that follow. Finally, it is important to
emphasize that this averaging increases the temporal correlation of the channel sequence, and
therefore the application of this technique must involve consideration of the impact of channel
correlation as discussed in Section 6.1.4.
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Channel Coding
A final technique considered is the application of channel coding to reduce mismatch
of the established key. Details of using LDPC coding to improve key agreement as well as
privacy amplification to distill perfect secret keys have been discussed in Section 4.5.4.
6.1.6

Simulation Results

Simulation Model
Observations show that multipaths in the physical environment can be grouped into
clusters of multipath components or rays, with each ray defined by its complex power gain,
angle of departure (AOD), angle of arrival (AOA), and time of arrival (TOA) [42, 31], although in a narrowband system the TOA can be neglected since all rays arrive within a small
fraction of a symbol time. The simulations in this section use a propagation model based on
this concept in which the bulk parameters defining the clusters vary in time according to a
statistical description and the clusters themselves can appear or disappear [66], with details
provided in Chapter 3. All simulations use the model parameters specified in Chapter 3.
In the simulations, we let NE = N1 and K = N0 + N12 + 1 so that the degrees of
freedom of error N0 in the statistical test are the same in every sequence independent of the
number of antennas. We choose N0 = 100 which, based on the model parameters used in the
simulations, satisfies the constraint that the time-variant channels in one sequence of length
K can be assumed to be approximately stationary. The MIMO channel estimation SNR is
transformed to the equivalent SISO SNR
SNR =

PK−1

kH(k) k2F
,
KN1 2 ση2

k=0

(6.10)

where k · kF denotes the Frobenius norm and ση2 is the error variance. σA2 is chosen to be
σA2

=

PK−1

kH(k) k2F
.
KN1 2

k=0

(6.11)

We emphasize that this algorithm does not focus on precisely how the matrix U(k) is
communicated across the channel, and as a result the values of U(k) are assumed to be error
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free. Details on the impact of errors in Bob’s estimate of U(k) and methods for reducing the
impact of the error is outside the scope of current work.
Statistical Test
We first consider Alice’s selection of A(k) to pass the statistical tests discussed in
Section 4.5. Figure 6.1 plots the probability mass function (PMF) of the number of realizations
of A(k) that must be generated by Alice before the tests are passed for a 3 × 3 MIMO system

with Q = 22 simulated over 2000 channel realizations each with length K = 110. These
simulations also assume that the key transmission and detection use Gray codes, least-square
estimation, and channel averaging (W = 10) for BER reduction. The results in Fig. 6.1
reveal that the number of realizations is less than 10 with very high probability and that the
probability of requiring more than 200 realizations is 0.0005. Similar results are obtained for
different numbers of antennas and quantization levels Q. In the simulations, if Alice does not
determine a suitable value of A(k) within 200 realizations, a new key sequence is generated and
the statistical test procedure is repeated. If this procedure fails for 10 different key sequences,
the simulation declares that the secret key generation has failed.
BER Reduction Techniques
Figure 6.2 plots the BER vs. SNR obtained using 2000 random 3 × 3 channel sequence
realizations of length K = 110. For each channel realization, a single key realization is
communicated using the techniques, with the quantization level set at Q = 24 . The different
curves represent the performance using natural binary codes, Gray codes, and least-square
detection respectively. While Gray coding offers some benefit, using least-square estimation
offers significantly improved BER performance as expected.
Figure 6.3 illustrates the performance when using channel averaging for BER reduction
for the same simulation parameters used to generate Fig. 6.2 compared to the performance
using Gray coding. The two curves for the averaged channels are for window sizes of W =
5 and W = 10. As expected, the larger window produces improved performance since it
results in smaller differences between the two channel estimates used in (6.3). However, it
is interesting that the improvement enabled by using averaging with W = 5 is much larger
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Figure 6.1: PMF of number of realizations of A(k) required to pass the statistical tests for
the 3 × 3 channel with quantization level Q = 22 . The simulations use 2000 random channel
sequences each with length K = 110 and assume Gray codes, least-square and channel averaging
methods are used for BER reduction.

than the incremental improvement resulting when the window size is increased from W = 5
to W = 10. Finally, Figure 6.4 shows the performance when Gray coding, least-square
estimation, and channel averaging with W = 10 are combined. The performance is given for
different quantization levels, revealing the intuitive results that a larger quantization level Q
requires a higher SNR to achieve the same target BER.
Secret Key vs. SNR
The ultimate performance metric for a MIMO-based key establishment method is the
number of secret bits that can be generated per channel realization. The following simulations
use Gray coding, least-square estimation, and channel averaging with W = 10. Furthermore,
the quantization level for each simulation is chosen so that the BER of key estimation is 10−3 .
Given the quantization level and the number of antennas N1 (length of each column of E(k) ),
we can establish the number of bits that can be transmitted. Because the number of columns
NE of the transmitted matrix E(k) may vary depending on the scenario, we simulate the results
for NE = 1, allowing simple scaling of the results for any desired choice of NE .
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Figure 6.2: BER vs. SNR when using natural binary and Gray codes as well as least-square
estimation. The simulations use 2000 3 × 3 channel sequences with length K = 110 and a
quantization level Q = 24 .

Figure 6.5 illustrates the key length versus SNR obtained using this simulation approach for different numbers of antennas. One observation from the curves is that at low
SNR, small antenna arrays outperform larger arrays due to lower achieved BER, although
this situation changes as the SNR increases. The circles in Fig. 6.5 show the points at which
it becomes advantageous to increase the array size (for example, increasing from two to three
antennas is denoted as 2 × 2 → 3 × 3). The curves also reveal that the slope increases with
the number of antennas, indicating that multiple antennas enable increased key establishment
efficiency at high SNR.
The SNR required for key generation can be dramatically reduced by using LDPC
codes in conjunction with the other BER reduction techniques already demonstrated. These
simulations include a rate 1/2 LDPC code of length 816 with the parity check matrix available
in [61]. The message-passing decoding algorithm [60] is used with 100 decoding iterations.
Since the syndromes of the bit sequences are transmitted over the public channel, privacy
amplification is performed using the universal class of Hash functions provided in [59, Proposition 9] and a safety parameter s = 10. Fig. 6.6 plots the number of secret bits versus SNR
achieved when BER = 10−3 for NE = 1 and different number of antennas. The observations
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Figure 6.3: BER vs. SNR when using the channel averaging method with two different averaging windows W compared to that using Gray coding. The simulations use 2000 3 × 3 channel
sequences with length K = 110 and a quantization level Q = 24 .

of the curves are similar to the corresponding curves in Fig. 6.5, although in this case the
LDPC codes allow MIMO to be exploited with significantly reduced SNR at the expense of
a reduction in the number of secret bits by a factor of approximately two (corresponding to
the rate 1/2 code).
It is also helpful to assess the performance of the technique relative to the achievable
bound derived by Maurer in [6]. Figure 6.7 compares the bound to the protocol performance of
a 3 × 3 system for NE = 3 applying LDPC coding and the other error reduction techniques. In
the case when no LDPC coding is used, a higher SNR is required to achieve the specified 10−3

BER because of the lack of coding gain. However, the approach does not suffer from secrecy
loss associated with the error control coding and privacy amplification, and it is therefore
more efficient, as evidenced by the increased slope of the curve which nearly matches the
slope specified by the upper bound. Since at high SNR the LDPC coding is unnecessary,
under these conditions the higher efficiency can be achieved by the system.
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Figure 6.4: BER vs. SNR when combining Gray coding, least-square estimation, and channel
averaging (W = 10) for different quantization levels Q. The simulations use 2000 3 × 3 channel
sequences with length K = 110.

6.1.7

Discussions
The key generation algorithm using channel multiplication to encrypt the key infor-

mation is practically feasible, and its performance is promising as demonstrated by the simulations. However, there is still a theoretical concern about the secrecy disclosed to Eve
through the public transmission of U(k) to Bob. Although a statistical test is performed to
eliminate the correlation between the key information and the U(k) matrix, the success of the
test implies no correlation, but not the desirable independence. Theoretically we can hash
out β = I(Θ(k) ; u) bits from the bits generated per channel using privacy amplification, but
it is almost impossible to estimate the mutual information β because u is a non-Gaussian
distributed and multivariate vector. Therefore, in the next section of the chapter we consider
generating secret keys with channel addition instead of multiplication. Also, another variant
of the channel-based key generation algorithms is proposed using one-time pad public discussion, which eliminates the potential secrecy disclosure problem existing in the algorithm with
channel multiplication.
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Figure 6.5: Secret key in bits per channel realization with BER = 10−3 using Gray codes,
least-square, and channel averaging for NE = 1 and different numbers of antennas.

6.2

Secret Key Generation with Channel Addition
In the development of the key establishment algorithm using channel addition, we

follow the same system model as discussed in Section 6.1.1 except that the channel matrices
are assumed to be temporally independent and the superscript (k) is dropped for convenience.
Practically, one approach to obtain temporally independent channel samples is to sample the
channel with intervals greater than the channel coherence time.
6.2.1

Key Establishment Algorithm Using Channel Addition
To begin the description of the algorithm, Alice constructs the E matrix following the

same approach detailed in Section 6.1.2 with an amplitude matrix A, and generates the secret
bits from the phases of E matrix. In this situation, E is an N1 × N1 matrix, with the same
size as the channel matrix. Instead of applying multiplication to derive the U matrix, Alice
obtains U as
U = Ha + E.
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(6.12)
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Figure 6.6: Secret key in bits per channel realization with BER = 10−3 using Gray codes,
least-square, channel averaging, and information reconciliation with LDPC codes for NE = 1
and different numbers of antennas.

After receiving U transmitted from Alice, Bob estimates Ê as
Ê = U − Hb = E + ∆Ha − ∆Hb ,

(6.13)

and obtains the secret bits from the phases of Ê. Because our goal is to explore the possibilities
of the approach, we assume that U is transmitted through an error-free channel to Bob.
Similar to the key generation algorithm with channel multiplication, the transmission
of U potentially discloses information about the key information within the E matrix to the
eavesdropper. In order to distill perfect secret keys, I(u; e) bits must be hashed out from the
bit sequence generated, where u = vec{U}, e = vec{E}. If we assume the channel vector ha
(ha = vec{Ha }) is Gaussian distributed with covariance Rh , and Q → ∞ which implies e
is Gaussian distributed with covariance Re = σA2 I, where σA2 is the variance of the elements

of the amplitude matrix A, u is also Gaussian distributed with covariance Ru = Rh + Re .
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Figure 6.7: Secret key in bits per channel realization for the Maurer’s bound and the algorithm
with BER = 10−3 using Gray codes, least-square, and error averaging with or without LDPC
codes for NE = 3.

Therefore, I(u; e) is estimated as
I(u; e) = H(u) − H(u|e)
= H(u) − H(e + ha |e)
= H(u) − H(ha |e)
= H(u) − H(ha )
= log2

|Rh + Re |
,
|Rh|

(6.14)

where we have applied H(ha |e) = H(ha ), and the entropy of a N ×1 jointly complex Gaussian

distributed vector y is H(y) = log2 π N |Ry |+N/ ln 2 (See Appendix B). From (6.14) we can see

that if we increase σA2 which is equivalent to increase the transmit power of U, the information
revealed to Eve is increased indicated by a larger value of I(u; e). However, if we decrease σA2 ,
key disagreement is increased due to less transmit power applied, which is clearly demonstrated
by the simulation in Section 6.2.2. Therefore, there is a trade-off between key disagreement
probability and potential information disclosed to Eve. Privacy amplification is applied to
distill secret bits by hashing out the information revealed to Eve through the transmission
109

of U. The number of ultimate secret bits obtained per channel realization is N1 2 log2 Q less
I(u; e), and less the value of the safety parameter (see Section 4.5.4) used in the privacy
amplification.
6.2.2

Simulation Results
We apply the SVA model used in Section 5.3.1 to simulate the performance of the algo-

rithm with channel addition. We also assume linear dipole arrays with half-wavelength element
spacing at both nodes, and for each realization of the multipath representation the N1 × N1
channel matrix Hm is computed for m = 1, 2, . . . M different random locations in the propaP
†
gation environment. The covariance of the channel is estimated as R = (1/M) M
m=1 hm hm ,
where hm = vec{Hm }. From this data, we define
PM

|Hm |2F
,
MN1 2
2
SNR = σH
/σe2 ,
2
σH

=

m=1

2
γ = σA2 /σH
.

(6.15)
(6.16)
(6.17)

Recall that σe2 and σA2 are the variances of channel estimation error and the element in the
amplitude matrix A respectively.
Figure 6.8 plots the estimated I(u; e), the information potentially disclosed to Eve by
the transmission of U, as a function of γ for different antenna arrays. The curves in the
figure show that increasing γ or equivalently the transmit power will increase I(u; e), which
is consistent with the observation from (6.14). For a fixed γ, more information is revealed if
a larger antenna array is used, which is intuitively reasonable because a larger antenna array
implies U has a larger size and more random variables are transmitted through the channel.
Because the channel matrices Hm for m = 1, 2, . . . , M are computed from the same
realization of multipath representations and are therefore correlated, in the simulation of BER
performance we only use one channel matrix for each realization of multipath representations,
i.e. we assume H = H1 . Figure 6.9 illustrates the BER performance of the algorithm with
channel addition for a 3 × 3 system, Q = 22 , γ = 0.25, 0.5, 1, 2. Observations reveal that
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Figure 6.8: Information potentially disclosed to Eve as a function of γ for different antenna
arrays.
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Figure 6.9: BER performance of the algorithm with Q = 22 , γ = 0.25, 0.5, 1, 2 for a 3 × 3
system.

with a larger γ, a better BER performance is achieved because more power is applied in the
transmission of U.
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The number of bits generated per channel for a 3 × 3 system with BER = 10−4 is

plotted in Fig. 6.10 for Q = 21 , . . . , 25 and γ = 0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, with the first points in the
curves denoting Q = 21 and the last points representing Q = 25 , before hashing out the
information disclosed to Eve through the transmission of U. Although Fig. 6.10 demonstrates
that to generate the same number of bits, or equivalently using the same quantization levels,
the algorithms applying a larger γ always require a smaller SNR, it is unfair to draw this
conclusion. Specifically, we have not yet considered the fact that a larger γ implies that more
information is disclosed to Eve through the transmission of U, as illustrated in Fig. 6.8. A
more reasonable comparison of the algorithm for different values of γ appears in Fig. 6.11,
which shows that the curves of Fig. 6.10 each shifted down by the distance Dγ = I(u; e). It
turns out that when γ is relatively small, increasing γ reduces the SNR required to generate
the key. However, although the required SNR for a fixed quantization level is reduced with
increasing γ, the information disclosed to Eve is also increased. Therefore, generating a specific
number of secret bits requires use of a larger quantization level to compensate for the bits
that are hashed out. Figure 6.11 shows that for a 3 × 3 system, the benefits of increasing γ
saturate when γ = 2. We also note that it makes no sense for the curves to drop below 0,
and the parts of the curves below 0 are included in Fig. 6.11 only to enable comparison with
Fig. 6.10.
6.3

Secret Key Generation with One-Time Pad Public Discussion
While the algorithm with channel addition is able to distill a perfect secret key by

applying privacy amplification, the amount of information potentially disclosed to Eve has to
be hashed out from the bits generated. In this section, we introduce an algorithm combining
channel encryption and quantization that discloses no information to Eve despite the fact that
some information is transmitted through the public channel. We note that because channel
quantization is used in this algorithm, the problems related to channel whitening exist as
discussed at the beginning of this chapter.
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Figure 6.10: Number of bits generated per channel with BER = 10−4 before applying privacy
amplification to hash out the information potentially disclosed to Eve, with γ = 0.25, 0.5, 1, 2 for
a 3 × 3 system.

6.3.1

Algorithm Development
In the development of the key generation algorithm using one-time pad public discus-

sion, we apply the system model detailed in Section 5.1.1 with i.i.d. SISO channel samples.
Let xa and xb denote the real or imaginary part of Alice’s and Bob’s channel estimates ha
and hb respectively. We wish to generate log2 Q bits from the pair of (xa ,xb ), which results in
2log2 Q bits generated per channel realization. Let xi denote the ith quantization boundary
of xa (or xb ) such that Fx (xi ) = i/Q, where i = 0, 1, . . . , Q and Fx (·) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of xa (or xb ). We also define a quantization function k = Ψ(x, Q)
which indicates that x is quantized with Q equally-likely quantization regions so that k = i if
xi ≤ x < xi+1 .
The key generation procedure proceeds as follows:
1. Alice and Bob agree on generating log2 Q bits per pair (xa , xb ), select an odd positive
integer N = 3, 5, 7, . . ., and form a Q × 1 vector v, with the qth element denoted as v(q),

T
q = 0, 1, . . . , Q − 1, v = N 2−1 , N 2−1 + N, . . . , N 2−1 + (Q − 1)N .
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Figure 6.11: Number of bits generated per channel with BER = 10−4 after applying privacy
amplification to hash out the information potentially disclosed to Eve, with γ = 0.25, 0.5, 1, 2 for
a 3 × 3 system.

2. Alice and Bob quantize xa and xb respectively to obtain ka = Ψ(xa , NQ) and kb =
Ψ(xb , NQ) with quantization level NQ.
3. Alice generates an integer ja from the set {0, 1, 2, . . . , Q − 1} randomly with equal probability and converts ja into its binary form. The resulting log2 Q binary bits, denoted
as Ja , represent the secret key generated by Alice.
4. Alice obtains an integer sa = v(ja ), computes z = mod(ka + sa , NQ), and transmits z
to Bob.
5. After receiving z from Alice, Bob estimates the integer sb = mod(z − kb , NQ) and finds
the element in v which minimizes |sb − v(q)|, q = 0, 1, . . . , Q − 1. Suppose the jb th
element v(jb ) is the one closest to sb , jb ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Q − 1}. Bob then forms the binary
bits Jb as the binary form of jb .
A graphic explanation of the algorithm is provided in Fig. 6.12. From the above
discussion, we have z = mod(ka + sa , NQ) and sb = mod(z − kb , NQ), which means that z is
the circular right shift with ka positions of the key information sa , and sb is the circular left
shift with kb positions of z, as shown in Fig 6.12. If no key disagreement occurs, sb should
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Figure 6.12: A graphic illustration of the algorithm.

Table 6.1: A simple example of the algorithm, Q = 22 , N = 3.

Q
N
v
ka
ja
Ja
sa = v(ja )
z
kb
sb
jb
Jb

2
9
3
11

3
8
2
10

22
3
[1, 4, 7, 10]T
4
2
10
7
11
4
7
2
10

5
6
2
10

6
5
1
01

satisfy |sa − sb | ≤ (N − 1)/2, which is equivalent to |ka − kb | ≤ (N − 1)/2. Therefore, the
boundary margin (see Section 5.2.3) is BMmin = (N − 1)/2NQ. As N → ∞, BMmin → 1/2Q.
We can demonstrate the algorithm with a simple example. Suppose Q = 22 , N = 3,

ja = 2, ka = Ψ(xa , NQ) = 4 and kb = Ψ(xb , NQ) = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 respectively. Table 6.1 lists
the values of all the variables involved in the key generation process as well as the secret bits
Ja and Jb . If ka = 4 and correspondingly kb ∈ {3, 4, 5}, the keys will be the same.
6.3.2

Public Discussion Achieving Perfect Secrecy
The rule of thumb in secret key generation from common randomness is to minimize

the public discussion between Alice and Bob, because if Eve intercepts information related
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to the secret key from the public discussion, the secrecy of the key is compromised. In this
algorithm, however, the addition of z = mod(ka + sa , NQ) is a one-time pad to sa (the key
information). The channel information represented by ka serves as the key in the one-time
pad, and sa is the message to be concealed. Because the entropy H(sa ) is very small (i.e.
several bits) and the common channel (or equivalently ka ) is truly random, we can apply the
one-time pad as long as realizations of the pairs (xa , xb ) used to derive (ka , kb ) are temporally
independent.
The public discussion with the transmission of z achieving perfect secrecy is proven by
the following corollary:
Corollary 1: p(z|sa ) = p(z), and consequently I(z; sa ) = 0.
The proof is provided in Appendix B.
6.3.3

Upper Bound of the Algorithm
In this section, we derive the upper bound of the secret bits generated per independent

realization of the pair (xa , xb ), which is the upper bound of H(Ja ). Note that H(Ja ) =
H(ja ) = H(sa ), and the information contained in Ja , ja and sa is equivalent. Suppose the key
disagreement probability satisfies
P (Ja 6= Jb ) = P (sa 6= sb ) = ǫ,

(6.18)

for a small nonnegative number ǫ. According to Fano’s Lemma [64], we have
H(sa |sb ) ≤ h0 (ǫ) + ǫlog2 (|S| − 1),

(6.19)

where h0 (ǫ) = −ǫlog2 ǫ − (1 − ǫ)log2 (1 − ǫ), |S| represents the number of distinct values sa
takes on with nonzero probability. Equation (6.19) shows that if ǫ → 0, then H(sa |sb ) → 0.
The upper bound of H(Ja ) is given by Corollary 2:
Corollary 2: H(Ja ) ≤ I(ka ; kb ) + H(sa |sb ).
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The proof is provided in Appendix B. Note that ka and kb are respectively the quantized
versions of xa and xb , so we have I(ka ; kb ) ≤ I(xa ; xb ). Therefore,
H(Ja) ≤ I(xa ; xb ) + H(sa |sb ).

(6.20)

If the key disagreement is negligible which implies H(sa |sb ) → 0, H(Ja ) is only bounded by
the mutual information of the common channel I(xa ; xb ).
6.3.4

Comparison to CQA and MAQ
Despite the fact that the specific implementation of CQA(N) and MAQ(N) (see Chap-

ter 5) is different from the algorithm with one-time pad public discussion, they have the same
boundary margin BMmin =

N −1
2N Q

when the total quantization level is NQ for CQA(N) or 2NQ

for MAQ(N). Therefore, the performance of the algorithms is similar, and for N → ∞ all
the algorithms achieve the same SER and probability of key disagreement bounds as detailed
in Section 5.2.4. Note that the only difference of the algorithm with one-time pad public
discussion from CQA(N) and MAQ(N) is that there are log2 NQ bits transmitted through
the public discussion, while the latter two require only log2 N bits transmitted.
6.3.5

Simulations
In the simulation we generate channel coefficients and channel estimation errors as i.i.d.

symmetric complex Guanssian random variables with variance σ 2 and ση2 respectively. The
SNR is defined as SNR = σ 2 /ση2 . Figure 6.13 plots the SER performance of the algorithm with
quantization level Q = 21 and different values of N. As shown in the figure, increasing N leads
to SER reduction such that the algorithm performance approaches the bound asymptotically.
This occurs because as we increase N, BMmin approaches 1/2Q. The KER performance is
illustrated in Fig. 6.14 with key length L = 128 bits for different values of N. The results
are consistent with the observations from Fig. 6.13, because a low SER implies a low key
disagreement probability. All of these simulation results are consistent with the simulations
in Section 5.2.5, demonstrating that the algorithm with one-time pad public discussion has
similar performance to that of CQA(N) and MAQ(N).
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Figure 6.13: SER performance of the algorithm with Q = 21 and N = 3, 5, 7 respectively.
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Figure 6.14: KER performance with quantization level Q = 21 , key length L = 128 bits and
N = 3, 5, 7 respectively.

6.4

Chapter Summary
In this chapter we first consider establishing secret keys with channel encryption instead

of applying channel quantization. Section 6.1 proposes a method for exploiting the increased
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randomness associated with the time-variant MIMO channel to establish secret keys between
wireless nodes. The presentation includes a proposed method for applying statistical tests
to minimize the information disclosed to an eavesdropper during application of the method,
and a discussion of methods for reducing the BER of the key estimation. Simulation results
using a physical path-based time-variant MIMO model demonstrate the effectiveness of the
BER reduction methods and show that although the length of the established key with small
antenna array exceeds that with more antennas at low SNR, the benefits of more antennas
in generating longer keys per channel with higher efficiency become dominant at high SNR.
Furthermore, for high SNR environments, the algorithm is able to achieve a curve of key
length versus SNR whose slope almost matches that of the theoretically achievable bound.
Because of the theoretical threat of secrecy disclosure of the algorithm with channel
multiplication, a modified version of the algorithm with channel addition is presented in
Section 6.2, which is able to estimate the amount of information revealed to the eavesdropper.
Privacy amplification is applied to achieve a perfect secret key. There is a trade-off between
the BER performance and the amount of information disclosed to Eve, since an increase in
transmit power leads to a reduction in BER but an increase in the potential disclosure of
information. Simulations show that there is a threshold where the benefit of reducing BER
by increasing the transmit power counteracts by the information potentially disclosed to the
eavesdropper.
Finally, Section 6.3 resorts to a combination of channel encryption and quantization by
utilizing a one-time pad public discussion such that no information is revealed to the eavesdropper through the public transmission. Perfect secrecy of the discussion is demonstrated
and an upper bound of the algorithm is presented. The discussion also shows that this algorithm has a performance equivalent to that of the CQA and MAQ techniques in terms of SER
and KER bound.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
This work has demonstrated secret key establishment using the time-variant MIMO
wireless channel as a source common randomness. The presentation begins with the development of a stochastic time-variant MIMO channel model based on experimental observations,
which forms a basis for many simulations in the dissertation. The discussion then turns to
investigating the impact of channel correlation on key generation performance, and ends with
proposals of several practical key generation algorithms. The results are summarized below.
7.1

Summary
Chapter 3 presents a stochastic time-varying MIMO channel model useful for simula-

tion of MIMO algorithms. The treatment extracts time series of multipath parameters (AOA,
AOD, and power gain) from the power angular spectra and develops an innovation process
for each parameter from the whitened time series. With this description, model realizations
are obtained by generalizing a time series from the innovation process and running it through
a correlation filter, which is the inverse of the whitening filter. The model incorporates birth
and death of multipath clusters and a mechanism for generating time-variant realizations of
the channel matrix. The accuracy of the model is demonstrated by comparing the probability
density function and power spectral density of the model output to the original measurements.
Two information theoretic metrics are also computed from the measurement as well as the
model outputs, and their comparison shows that the model is able to capture the characteristics of the physical time-variant MIMO channel. Finally, a brief discussion is included to
extend the model for three-dimensional implementation.
Chapter 4 discusses secret key establishment using temporally and spatially correlated
channel coefficients in a time-variant MIMO channel. The influence of channel correlation on
the bound of the secret key is first investigated by a simple SISO channel with a zero-order
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Bessel function as the correlation function, leading to the discovery of an efficient sampling
approach for generating a key of a specified length. The presentation also includes a discussion on the channel decorrelation process and considers the separability of the spatial and
temporal decorrelation process. A published algorithm quantizing the channel coefficients is
reconsidered with flexible quantization levels as well as an with error correction technique
using LDPC codes to reduce key disagreement. Simulations using real channel measurements
reconfirm the results revealed by the simple example and demonstrate that a more effective
algorithm is required to achieve the bound.
Chapter 5 proposes improved channel quantization methods as generalizations of the
CQA and MAQ key generation algorithms that improve probability of key agreement. To
characterize the key mismatch performance, a metric named boundary margin is defined that
directly relates to the SER performance of the algorithm. A SER bound is derived in terms
of SNR and quantization levels, which further leads to the derivation of the bound of the
KER related to the specific key length, SNR and quantization level. Simulations using i.i.d.
symmetric complex Gaussian random variables show that the performance of the algorithm
approaches the KER bound asymptotically as the total quantization level increases. The
comparison of the upper bound and the performance of the algorithm in terms of the key
length versus SNR reveals that both algorithms are able to efficiently extract a secret key.
Simulations with both the SVA and time-variant MIMO channel models suggest that more
secret bits are generated using larger antenna arrays. Further, in the SVA model simulation
behavior of the algorithms relative to that of the bound shows that the algorithms are able
to capture the increased common randomness available in a MIMO system.
Chapter 6 presents three channel-encryption based key generation algorithms, including
one that uses channel multiplication and is able to avoid whitening issues associated with
correlated channel samples. A statistical test is performed in the algorithm with channel
multiplication to minimize the information disclosed to the eavesdropper, and error reduction
techniques are applied to improve key agreement. Simulation results show that the algorithm
is able to extract secrecy from the common wireless channel. However, a theoretical threat
exists in the algorithm, since independence between the key and the information in the public
discussion cannot be proven. Modifications to the algorithm are therefore suggested, resulting
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in the algorithm with channel addition in a temporally white channel. A perfect secret key
is distilled through privacy amplification with this algorithm, since it allows the amount of
information potentially revealed to the eavesdropper to be estimated. Finally, an algorithm
using both channel encryption and quantization is discussed that implements a one-time pad
public discussion, achieving perfect secrecy even if some information is transmitted through
the public channel. This algorithm has similar performance to the previously-introduced CQA
and MAQ algorithms in terms of the SER and KER bound.
7.2

Limitations
While the algorithms discussed in this dissertation show significant potential for es-

tablishing secret keys based on the common wireless channel, it is important to articulate the
requirements for their use:
1. The wireless channel must be reciprocal, and the systems must use time-division duplexing. We emphasize that while electromagnetic propagation is typically reciprocal,
the radio frequency electronics within a radio often are not. Therefore, calibration must
be used to compensate for any non-reciprocal contributions to the channel.
2. The environment should lead to small correlation between channel samples in space and
time. This typically is achieved in environments characteristized by rich scattering with
mobile communication nodes or scatterers.
3. The common channel between the legitimate nodes is independent from the channel
between these nodes and the eavesdropper. Fortunately, this is also achieved by rich
scattering.
4. The algorithms assume that the channel between the legitimate nodes is authenticated,
meaning that the transmission of public information originates from the legitimate nodes
without the introduction of fraudulent information.
If these constraints are not satisfied, then different algorithmic approaches should be exploited.
The identification of approaches that do not share these requirements is an important area
for future research.
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7.3

Future Work
Possible future work on these topics include the following:

1. Although we have investigated the performance of CQA and MAQ in Chapter 5 using
i.i.d. Guaussian random variables in a SISO system as well as using the SVA model and
the time-variant MIMO channel model for a MIMO system, physical implementation
of the algorithms with realistic two-way channel estimation would help us to further
understand the behavior and performance of these approaches.
2. In Section 4.4 we have discussed the temporal and spatial separability of the channel
decorrelation process, with the conclusion that the channel decorrelation process is inseparable. Therefore, it is interesting to explore the possibility of finding other efficient
approaches for channel decorrelation.
3. The bound of secret key rate as well as the evaluation of key generation algorithms
depends on the channel covariance, as shown in Section 5.3. Therefore, a good method
for estimating the channel covariance for a specific environment is useful.
4. In the algorithm with channel multiplication, we apply a matrix inverse to estimate the
key, which makes the algorithm infeasible when the channel is ill-conditioned. Modifications should be made to extend this algorithm to the ill-conditioned channel. Furthermore, all channel encryption based algorithms presented here assume that Bob receives
error-free information transmitted through the public channel, which is not usually the
case in a practical situation. Therefore, future work should evaluate the impact of errors
in the information transmitted through the channel.
5. All of the algorithms considered in this work as well as the other published algorithms
are valid under the assumption that the eavesdropper’s channel is independent of the
common channel. It would be interesting to modify the existing algorithms or propose
new algorithms in the situation where Eve’s channel is correlated to the common channel.
As a final note, a non-trivial use of the common wireless channel in the application of
authentication is possible, since some unique information about the common channel is shared
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by the two legitimate nodes only. This unique information can be used to identify malicious
impersonation and protect date integrity if properly applied.
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Appendix A
Model Implementation Parameters
Different propagation environments will be characterized by different innovation pdfs
and PSD curves, and therefore additional work is necessary to tabulate these characteristics
over a variety of scenarios. However, it may be useful for some researchers to be able to
implement the model based on the measurements considered in this study. Therefore, this
appendix contains data that enables computer implementation of the model discussed.
The pdf describing the innovation process for each of the three cluster parameters, as
shown in Fig. 3.6, can be very accurately approximated by the following empirical curve fits:
√

pR (χR ) = 1.455e−|

√

pT (χT ) = 1.831e−|

2χR /0.45|
2χT /0.35|

√
−| 2χG /0.7|

pG (χG ) = 1.037e

√

+ 0.076e−|

√

+ 0.052e−|

2(χR −2.3)/0.5|

√

+ 0.076e−|

2(χT −2.8)/0.45|

2(χR +2.3)/0.5|

√

+ 0.052e−|

,
(A.1)

2(χT +2.8)/0.45|

,
(A.2)

,

(A.3)

with −8 ≤ χR ≤ 8, −8 ≤ χT ≤ 8 and −10 ≤ χG ≤ 10.
Table A.1 details the coefficients used in (3.10) to estimate the PSD in (3.9) for each
cluster parameter. Tables A.2 and A.3 provide discrete approximations (PMFs) to the pdf
of the cluster power gain mean µG as well as the square root of the power gain variance σG
conditioned on the mean.
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Table A.1: Coefficients for estimating the PSD for each cluster parameter.

γ
aγ,1
aγ,2
aγ,3
aγ,4
bγ

T
R
-2.8918
-2.9023
2.7704
2.8082
-0.8604
-0.9058
-0.0182
6.0594 × 10−4 4.0648 × 10−4

G
-1.8902
0.8208
0.0742
0.023

Table A.2: PMF of the cluster power gain mean.

µG
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55

Probability
0.1005
0.3333
0.1640
0.1270
0.0741
0.0688

µG
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85

Probability
0.0317
0.0265
0.0265
0.0212
0.0159
0.0106

Table A.3: PMF of σG conditioned on µG .

µG

0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85

0.05
0.8947
0.6190
0.3704
0.2857
0.3333
0.4167
0.3333
0
0
0
0.6667
0

0.10
0.1053
0.3810
0.5556
0.4286
0.0833
0.3333
0.1667
0.5
0.6
0.5
0
1
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σG
0.15
0
0
0.0741
0.2381
0.1667
0.0833
0
0.25
0.4
0.25
0.3333
0

0.20
0
0
0
0.0476
0.4167
0.1667
0.1667
0
0
0.25
0
0

0.25
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.3333
0.25
0
0
0
0

Appendix B
Proofs for Channel-Based Encryption Algorithms
Proof: H(y) = log2 π N |Ry | + N/ ln 2, where y is a N × 1 zero-mean jointly complex
Gaussian distributed random vector with covariance Ry .
Proof : The probability density function of the multivariant complex normal distributed vector
y is
1
† −1
e−y Ry y .
(B.1)
p(y) = N
π |Ry |
The entropy of y is

Z

H(y) = − p(y) log2 p(y)dy
Z y
= p(y)(log2 π N |Ry | + y† R−1
y y/ ln 2)dy
y
Z
1
N
= log2 π |Ry | +
p(y)y† R−1
y ydy
ln 2 y
Z

1
N
†
p(y)tr R−1
dy
= log2 π |Ry | +
y yy
ln 2 y

= log2 π N |Ry | + N/ ln 2,
 −1 †
where we have applied y† R−1
(end of proof).
y y = tr Ry yy

(B.2)

Proof of Corollary 1: p(z|sa ) = p(z), and consequently I(z; sa ) = 0.
Proof : To begin with, we have p(ka ) = N1Q . Because p(k) = Q1 and sa = v(k), so p(sa ) =

1
.
Q

p(z|sa ) = p(mod(ka + sa , NQ)|sa )
= p(ka + sa |sa )P (0 ≤ ka < NQ − sa ) + p(ka + sa − NQ|sa )P (NQ − sa ≤ ka < NQ)
= p(ka )P (0 ≤ ka < NQ − sa ) + p(ka )P (NQ − sa ≤ ka < NQ)
1
=
[P (0 ≤ ka < NQ − sa ) + P (NQ − sa ≤ ka < NQ)]
NQ
1
,
(B.3)
=
NQ
where P (0 ≤ ka < NQ − sa ) represents the probability of 0 ≤ ka < NQ − sa , p(ka +
sa |sa ) = p(ka |sa ) = p(ka ) and p(ka + sa − NQ|sa ) = p(ka ) because ka and sa are independent,
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P (0 ≤ ka < NQ − sa ) + P (NQ − sa ≤ ka < NQ) = 1.
X
p(z) =
p(z|sa )p(sa )
s

=

1 X
p(sa )
NQ s
a

1
NQ
= p(z|sa ).
=

(B.4)

Consequently, I(z; sa ) = H(z) − H(z|sa ) = 0 (end of proof).
Proof of Corollary 2: H(Ja ) ≤ I(ka ; kb) + H(sa|sb ).
Proof : Because we have z = mod(ka + sa , NQ) and sb = mod(z − kb , NQ), so the following
equalities are obtained,
H(ka |z, sa ) = 0,
H(sa |ka , z) = 0,
H(sb |z, kb ) = 0.

(B.5)
(B.6)
(B.7)

Recall that I(z; sa ) = 0, we have
H(sa) = H(sa|z)
= H(sa, ka |z) − H(ka |sa , z)
= H(ka|z) + H(sa |ka, z)
= H(ka|z) − H(ka |kb , z) + H(ka |kb , z)
= I(ka ; kb|z) + H(ka|kb , z)
= I(ka ; kb|z) + H(ka|kb , z, sb )
= I(ka ; kb|z) + H(ka, sa |kb, z, sb ) − H(sa|ka , kb , z, sb )
= I(ka ; kb|z) + H(ka, sa |kb, z, sb )
= I(ka ; kb|z) + H(sa |kb, z, sb ) + H(ka |sa , kb , z, sb )
= I(ka ; kb|z) + H(sa |kb, z, sb )
≤ I(ka ; kb |z) + H(sa |sb ),

(B.8)

where the last inequality is achieved because of H(sa |sb ) ≥ H(sa |kb, z, sb ).
I(ka ; kb |z) = H(kb |z) − H(kb|ka , z)
= H(kb |z) − H(kb|ka )
= H(kb ) − H(kb ) + H(kb |z) − H(kb|ka )
= I(kb ; ka ) − I(kb ; z)
≤ I(kb ; ka ),
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(B.9)

where H(kb |ka , z) = H(kb |ka ) is because z is a function of ka , and the inequality achieves due
to I(kb ; z) ≥ 0. Therefore,
H(sa ) ≤ I(kb ; ka ) + H(sa |sb ).
(B.10)
Because H(Ja ) = H(sa ), we finally have H(Ja ) ≤ I(kb ; ka ) + H(sa |sb ) (end of proof).
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